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FIGHTING FINES & FEES: 
BORROWING FROM CONSUMER LAW TO 
COMBAT CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT 
ABUSES 
NEIL L. SOBOL* 
Although media and academic sources often describe mass 
incarceration as the primary challenge facing the American 
criminal justice system, the imposition of criminal justice 
debt may be a more pervasive problem. On March 14, 2016, 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) requested that state chief 
justices forward a letter to all judges in their jurisdictions 
describing the constitutional violations associated with the 
illegal assessment and enforcement of fines and fees. The 
DOJ’s concerns include the incarceration of indigent 
individuals without determining whether the failure to pay 
is willful and the use of bail practices that result in 
impoverished defendants remaining in jail merely because 
they are unable to afford bail. 
Criminal justice debt, also known as legal financial 
obligations (LFOs), impacts not only those incarcerated but 
also millions of others who receive economic sanctions for 
low-level offenses, including misdemeanors and ordinance 
violations. LFOs, which include bail, fines, and fees, are 
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imposed at every stage in the justice process, including pre-
conviction, sentencing, incarceration, and post-release 
supervision. 
For those who are unable to pay criminal justice debt, 
“poverty penalties” are often added in the form of charges for 
interest, payment plans, late payments, and collection. As 
incarceration rates and local budgetary concerns have 
increased, so too has the imposition of LFOs. Moreover, 
while authorities are trying to reduce incarceration, criminal 
justice debt may become an even greater concern, as one 
popular alternative is decriminalization and the imposition 
of monetary charges. 
Often the financial charges are unrelated to the traditional 
notions of punishment or protection of public safety and 
instead, reflect a desire to maximize revenue collection. Many 
municipalities outsource services to private probation 
companies and collectors, which are often unsupervised and 
use collection procedures not authorized for private parties. 
Moreover, new technologies allow for additional collection 
abuses. 
To date, states and municipalities have been ineffective in 
preventing abuses associated with criminal justice debt. 
Relying on the approach used for consumer debt collection, I 
propose a federal solution. The Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) provide the foundation for a 
federal framework for addressing problems with the 
collection of consumer debts. I contend that the justifications 
that supported the federal statutory and administrative 
solution for consumer debts are at least as significant, if not 
greater, for a similar framework to combat abusive criminal 
justice debt practices. 
Not only do individuals with criminal justice debt encounter 
the same abuses and consequences that consumer debtors 
face—including harassment, negative credit reports, and the 
adverse impact on financing and employment prospects—but 
they also face denial of welfare benefits, suspension of 
driver’s licenses, arrest, and incarceration. In practice, the 
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imposition of criminal justice debt reflects actual 
discrimination and creates distrust in the system. 
Accordingly, I advocate the adoption of a federal act and the 
use of the DOJ to coordinate enforcement and outreach 
activities to attack abuses in the collection of criminal justice 
debt. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The last thirty years have seen dramatic growth in civil 
consumer debt and criminal justice debt, as well as abuses 
associated with the collection of such debts. Consumer debt 
includes amounts owed for personal, family, and household 
issues, including mortgages, medical bills, credit card balances, 
auto loan debt, and student loan debt.1 Criminal justice debt 
includes charges for bail, fines, and fees.2 Consumer debtors 
and individuals with criminal justice debt experience many of 
the same abuses and consequences, including harassment by 
collectors, adverse credit reports, restricted financing 
opportunities, embarrassment, and strain on family resources. 
Additionally, criminal justice debt can lead to denial of welfare 
benefits, suspension of driver’s licenses, disenfranchisement, 
arrest, and incarceration.3 
While federal legislative and regulatory efforts address 
problems associated with the abusive collection of civil debt, 
similar efforts have not been used to combat the abusive 
 
 1. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (2012) (defining debt under the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money 
arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance or services 
which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or 
household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to 
judgment”). 
 2. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ISSUE BRIEF: FINES, FEES, AND BAIL 1 
(2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/1215_ 
cea_fine_fee_bail_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLQ7-E7S5]. 
 3. ARTHUR W. PEPIN, CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, 2015-2016 
POLICY PAPER: THE END OF DEBTORS’ PRISONS: EFFECTIVE COURT POLICIES FOR 
SUCCESSFUL COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS 4–9 (2016), 
http://cosca.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/COSCA/Policy%20Papers/End-of-
Debtors-Prisons-2016.ashx [https://perma.cc/W9JN-TB2N]; ABBY SHAFROTH & 
LARRY SCHWARTZOL, CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM & NAT’L CONSUMER 
LAW CTR., CONFRONTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: THE URGENT NEED FOR 
COMPREHENSIVE REFORM 6–7 (2016), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/ 
Confronting-Criminal-Justice-Debt-The-Urgent-Need-for-Comprehensive-
Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9P5-WNA9]. 
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collection of criminal justice debt.4 The failure to develop these 
efforts is especially disconcerting because of the additional 
collateral consequences associated with criminal justice debt.5 
The thesis of this Article is that just as abuses in civil debt 
collection created a need for a federal statutory and 
administrative solution, abuses in the assessment and 
collection of criminal justice debt demand a similar solution. 
The following examples illustrate some of the differences 
in the treatment of abuses in the collection of consumer and 
criminal justice debt. 
Case 1: Vehicle Financing: Westlake Services, LLC and 
its wholly owned subsidiary, Wilshire Consumer 
Credit, LLC (collectively, “Westlake”) 
Westlake services subprime vehicle loans made to 
borrowers with low credit scores.6 Using “Skip Tracy,” a web-
based service that alters caller-ID information, Westlake 
allegedly called debtors and their families, friends, and 
employers with spoofed caller-ID information to reflect that 
calls were coming from flower shops or pizza delivery 
companies.7 In its communications, Westlake pretended to be 
 
 4. This Article builds on concepts developed in my prior articles and suggests 
applying the framework used to address consumer debt collection abuses to attack 
abuses involved in the collection of criminal justice debt. See, e.g., Neil L. Sobol, 
Protecting Consumers from Zombie-Debt Collectors, 44 N.M. L. REV. 327 (2014) 
(proposing methods of preventing abuses by debt buyers collecting on consumer 
debts which are often stale, previously paid or settled, or never incurred by the 
alleged debtor); Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & 
Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons, 75 MD. L. REV. 486 (2016) (describing how the same 
concerns that led to calls for abolition of debtors’ prisons for civil debt in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries now exist with regard to the use of 
incarceration for criminal justice debt). 
 5. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA’S 
“OFFENDER-FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 29 (2014), http://www.hrw.org/ 
sites/default/files/reports/us0214_ForUpload_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/UX63-QT39] 
(describing how a probationer facing a two-year probation to pay a $1200 fine and 
a $35 monthly fee would be better off and would not face the threat of 
incarceration if she had had a civil consumer debt arising from a $2400 two-year 
loan with a 50 percent interest rate). 
 6. Consent Order ¶¶ 4–5, Westlake Servs., LLC, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0026 
(Sept. 30, 2005), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509_cfpb_consent-order-
westlake-services-llc.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WTT-NFMR]. For more information 
about Westlake, see its website http://www.westlakefinancial.com/Pages/ 
default.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2017) [https://perma.cc/887Y-SW4Q]. 
 7. Consent Order, supra note 6, ¶¶ 7, 23. As defined in the Consent Order, 
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from those companies to obtain information about the location 
of debtors and their vehicles.8 Additionally, Westlake allegedly 
changed caller-ID information and pretended to be from 
investigation, enforcement, and repossession entities. In so 
doing, Westlake implicitly and explicitly threatened to 
repossess vehicles and file criminal charges against borrowers.9 
Case 2: Private Probation Services: Sentinel Offenders 
Services, LLC (“Sentinel”) 
Sentinel is a private probation company, which offers “zero 
cost” solutions to municipalities that outsource probation and 
supervision of criminal defendants.10 Sentinel’s revenue is 
based solely on fees collected from those under probation or 
supervision.11 Private probation companies often act with little 
or no governmental oversight.12 
Thomas Barrett of Georgia is one of Sentinel’s victims. His 
widely reported story reflects the difficult choices that indigent 
individuals face when dealing with criminal justice debt.13 
Barrett—a homeless, unemployed veteran—was arrested for 
shoplifting a can of beer worth less than $2. Barrett refused his 
“free” public defender because he was told the representation 
would cost $50, and he pleaded no contest.14 He received a $200 
fine, was sentenced to twelve months of probation, and was 
ordered to wear an electronic monitoring bracelet under the 
supervision of Sentinel.15 Sentinel charged Barrett a $50 set-up 
 
“‘Skip Tracy’ means a web-based, multimedia, third-party paid service that allows 
users to place outgoing calls and choose (a) the phone number from which the 
calls will appear to have originated; and (b) particular text that may appear on 
call recipients’ phones as Caller ID.” Id. ¶ 3m. 
 8. Id. ¶¶ 24–26. 
 9. Id. ¶¶ 11–14, 48–52. 
 10. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 14. 
 11. Id. at 15–16. 
 12. Id. at 55–62. 
 13. Id. at 34; Note, Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1726 (2015); 
Terry Carter, Privatized Probation Becomes a Spiral of Added Fees and Jail Time, 
A.B.A. J., Oct. 2014, at 61, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ 
probationers_prison_privatized_supervision_becomes_a_spiral_of_added_fees_j 
[https://perma.cc/S7H4-MVHL]; Joseph Shapiro, Measures Aimed At Keeping 
People Out Of Jail Punish The Poor, NPR (May 24, 2014, 4:58 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/05/24/314866421/measures-aimed-at-keeping-people-out-
of-jail-punish-the-poor [https://perma.cc/XQX5-E5A7]. 
 14. Shapiro, supra note 13. 
 15. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 34. 
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fee, a $12 daily rental, and an additional $39 in monthly fees.16 
Unfortunately, Barrett’s income was only about $300 a month, 
which he earned from donating plasma. When Barrett chose to 
skip meals to save money, he was limited in his ability to give 
plasma. Eventually, he fell behind on his payments, and he 
owed over $1000 in fees, more than five times the original 
fine.17 
Because Sentinel applied payments first to amounts owed 
to Sentinel, Barrett still owed the full amount of the original 
fine as well as outstanding amounts due on Sentinel’s fees. 
When he was unable to pay Sentinel’s fees, Sentinel petitioned 
the court to revoke Barrett’s probation. Relying on testimony 
from Sentinel, the court revoked his probation and jailed 
Barrett.18 Neither Sentinel nor the court considered his ability 
to pay.19 
Although the civil and criminal scenarios both involve the 
abusive collection of debt, the protections available to the 
affected parties vary significantly. In the first case, federal 
statutory remedies under the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act (FDCPA) exist to help consumers faced with abusive debt 
collectors.20 For example, the FDCPA prohibits collectors of 
consumer debt from engaging in harassing or abusive conduct, 
making false or misleading representations, or using unfair or 
unconscionable means.21 It also places restrictions on 
communications with third parties and establishes affirmative 
disclosure requirements for collectors.22 Additionally, in 2010, 
Congress established the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) to protect consumers “from unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive acts and practices.”23 The CFPB has investigative, 
regulatory, and enforcement powers.24 
The CFPB investigated the complaints against Westlake 
and filed an administrative proceeding alleging violations of 
the FDCPA on over 137,000 loan accounts.25 The CFPB found 
 
 16. Shapiro, supra note 13. 
 17. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 34–35. 
 18. Id. at 2, 34–35. 
 19. Id. at 34–35. 
 20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692o (2012). 
 21. Id. §§ 1692d–1692f. 
 22. Id. §§ 1692c, 1692g. 
 23. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(2) (2012). 
 24. Id. § 5511(c). 
 25. Consent Order, supra note 6, ¶ 10. 
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that Westlake violated the FDCPA’s prohibitions on debt 
collectors using false, deceptive, or misleading 
representations.26 Specifically, the CFPB found that Westlake 
used false pretenses in contacting borrowers to determine 
location information and deceived consumers about who they 
were and what actions they intended to take, including falsely 
threatening imminent repossession and criminal charges.27 
Additionally, the CFPB found that the calls to third parties—
including employers, families, and friends—illegally disclosed 
loan information.28 
Westlake and the CFPB entered into a consent order 
providing that Westlake pay more than $44 million in victim 
relief and $4.25 million as a civil penalty.29 Additionally, the 
order established specific conduct requirements and a 
compliance plan for Westlake that included recordkeeping and 
reporting obligations.30 As a result, the CFPB and the FDCPA 
provided relief for victims of Westlake’s abusive and deceptive 
actions and established a plan to prevent further abuses. 
Mr. Barrett and other similarly situated defendants, on 
the other hand, do not have the same safeguards. Although 
United States Supreme Court case law dating back to 1983 
requires a finding of ability to pay before revoking an 
individual’s probation,31 in practice, courts often fail to have 
such hearings.32 Moreover, even if courts hold hearings, they 
often fail to adequately assess ability to pay, and indigent 
individuals are typically not represented by counsel.33 A 
comprehensive federal framework to confront abuses in 
criminal justice debt collection does not exist. Instead, abuses 
 
 26. Id. ¶ 17 (alleging violations under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e). 
 27. Id. ¶¶ 17–28, 48–54 (alleging violations under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5), (10), 
(14) as well as violations under 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536(a)(1)). 
 28. Id. ¶¶ 29–47 (alleging violations under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) as well as 
violations under 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(c)(l), 5536(a)(1)(B)). 
 29. Id. ¶¶ 98–100, 107–111; Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 
CFPB Orders Indirect Auto Finance Company to Provide Consumers $44.1 
Million in Relief for Illegal Debt Collection Tactics (Oct. 1, 2015), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-orders-indirect-auto-finance-
company-to-provide-consumers-44-1-million-in-relief-for-illegal-debt-collection-
tactics/ [https://perma.cc/44TM-VDT6]. Under the Consent Order, victim relief 
includes payments to affected consumers for nearly $26 million and reductions in 
amounts owed of nearly $17.5 million. Consent Order, supra note 6, ¶¶ 98–100. 
 30. Consent Order, supra note 6, ¶¶ 91–97, 116–17, 121–24. 
 31. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671–73 (1983). 
 32. Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 4, at 512–14. 
 33. Id. at 514–15. 
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in criminal justice debt collection are often not addressed, and, 
even in situations where they are raised, it is typically by a 
non-profit group filing a lawsuit that is limited to a particular 
municipality.34 A piecemeal municipality-by-municipality 
approach, however, is not an effective means of addressing the 
national problems of abuses in criminal justice debt.35 
Abusive collection of criminal justice debt is a significant 
and growing problem in the United States. Estimates indicate 
that “tens of millions”36 have been charged criminal justice 
debt aggregating more than $50 billion.37 Fueled by the 
development of mass incarceration and budgetary concerns at 
the state and local level, the debt burden on defendants has 
increased dramatically over the last thirty years.38 Moreover, 
unintended consequences of current efforts to reduce 
incarceration may further increase criminal justice debt as 
municipalities replace incarceration with fines or charge fees 
for participation in alternative programs.39 Unfortunately, 
those unable to pay these assessments face not only increased 
criminal justice debt but may also wind up incarcerated for 
their failure to pay.40 
The abuses in criminal justice debt collection also include 
over-reliance on the criminal justice system to fund municipal 
operations. The Ferguson report revealed a system in which all 
local parties—the city, the police, and the court—focused on 
 
 34. Equal Justice Under Law is a non-profit group that has filed several 
actions seeking to end abuses related to the collection of criminal justice debt 
including actions to end the use of cash bail systems, debtors’ prisons, and abusive 
probation practices. See Litigation, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, 
http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/current-cases/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/3PK9-M6RW]. 
 35. See Radley Balko, A Debtors’ Prison in Mississippi, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/10/21/a-debtors-
prison-in-mississippi/ [https://perma.cc/BD2P-GNPD]. 
 36. Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Monetary 
Sanctions as Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509, 516 (2011). 
 37. LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CHARGING INMATES 
PERPETUATES MASS INCARCERATION 1 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/blog/Charging_Inmates_Mass_Incarceration.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SZJ8-UR9P]. 
 38. See infra Part I.B. 
 39. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 
1055, 1086–92 (2015). 
 40. For a more detailed discussion of the problems that arise when indigent 
individuals are incarcerated for failure to pay criminal justice debt, see Sobol, 
Charging the Poor, supra note 4. 
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revenue collection rather than public safety.41 Similarly, the 
increasing reliance on outsourced services has created further 
abuses based on lack of supervision of private, for-profit 
companies who act with authority and powers delegated by 
municipalities.42 Moreover, criminal justice debt is often 
imposed without regard to ability to pay.43 As a result, indigent 
individuals and their families become trapped in a poverty 
cycle that they can never escape.44 
The poor and minorities are most susceptible to abusive 
collection practices.45 Ironically, the inability to pay often 
results in additional fees, known as poverty penalties that exist 
solely because of an individual’s  inability to pay. These 
penalties include late fees, installment charges, and 
supervision assessments until payment is made. Criminal 
justice debt and the corresponding criminal record can lead to a 
loss of welfare benefits and create difficulties in obtaining 
financing, housing, and employment, which, in turn, further 
reduce the ability to repay the debt.46 Moreover, the fear of 
arrest or incarceration for failure to pay creates distrust in the 
system.47 Additionally, the use of discretionary fines and fees is 
subject to abuse and discrimination in practice.48 A more 
effective system is necessary for addressing abuses in the 
 
 41. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 10 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/ 
crt/about/spl/documents/ferguson_findings_3-4-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BK4-
5AC2] [hereinafter FPD REP.]. The report on the Ferguson Police Department was 
initiated after an officer’s 2014 fatal shooting of Michael Brown, an unarmed 
black teenager. Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney 
General Holder Delivers Update on Investigations in Ferguson, Missouri, 
JUSTICE.GOV (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-
holder-delivers-update-investigations-ferguson-missouri [https://perma.cc/A4TC-
HSXM]. In the report, the DOJ investigated not only the police department but 
also municipal and court officials. FPD REP. supra, at 1. The examination 
included interviews of officials and city residents, courtroom observations, and 
review of police, city, and court records. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the 
background, methodology, findings, and conclusions of the report, see Neil L. 
Sobol, Lessons Learned from Ferguson: Ending Abusive Collection of Criminal 
Justice Debt, 15 U. MD. L.J. OF RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 293, 295–303 
(2015). 
 42. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 43. See infra Part I.C.3. 
 44. See infra Part I.C.4. 
 45. See infra Part I.C.4, 5. 
 46. See infra Part I.C.4. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See infra Part I.C.5. 
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collection of criminal justice debt. 
A federal statutory and regulatory approach addresses 
abuse in the collection of consumer debt. The FDCPA sets forth 
prohibited practices (e.g., time and place restrictions on 
communications), and required practices (e.g., disclosure 
notices) for the collection of consumer debt.49 The CFPB 
administers the FDCPA, collects consumer complaint data, and 
coordinates enforcement, outreach, and research activities with 
federal, state, and local governments and organizations.50 
I advocate a similar system for confronting collection abuse 
in the criminal justice arena. I suggest the adoption of a federal 
statute, the Fair Justice Debt Practices Act (FJDPA), and use 
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) to help with the 
administration of the FJDPA and the coordination of 
enforcement, research, and outreach activities. 
I begin by identifying the collection abuses that exist in the 
criminal justice system and how such abuses adversely impact 
the poor and minorities. Part II describes the history of FDCPA 
and CFPB and shows that the concerns that led to the creation 
of a federal framework for addressing civil debt are at least as 
great, if not greater, than the concerns that exist in the 
collection of criminal justice debt given the additional 
consequences, including the threat of loss of liberties. 
Part III examines the principal remedies developed in the 
FDCPA and CFPB for civil debt collection and makes proposals 
for similar methods to address abuses in the collection of 
criminal justice debt. Finally, in Part IV, I briefly address some 
of the federalism concerns that will likely arise based on my 
call for a federal solution. 
The consequences of abuses in the criminal justice system 
demand that a better system be developed. We should draw on 
our experience in combating abuses in consumer debt collection 
to help prevent the even more severe consequences that arise 
in collecting criminal justice debt. 
I. ABUSES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT COLLECTION 
While the issue of mass incarceration in the United States 
has generated substantial political debate and media coverage, 
 
 49. See infra Part III.A, B. 
 50. See infra Part III.C. 
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criminal justice debt impacts more citizens than 
incarceration.51 Criminal justice debt has grown along with the 
growth in incarceration.52 Moreover, criminal justice debt is 
not limited to those incarcerated as it may also extend to 
anyone arrested or under supervision.53 Approximately one-
quarter to one-third of American adults have an arrest or 
criminal record.54 In 2012, police made over 12 million 
arrests.55 This Part identifies the components of criminal 
justice debt, explains the reasons for growth in criminal justice 
debt, and identifies major abuses associated with the collection 
of criminal justice debt, including the collateral consequences 
and disproportionate impact on the poor and minorities. 
A. Components of Criminal Justice Debt 
Criminal justice debt is a broad concept encompassing all 
of the economic charges imposed in the justice process. Often 
labeled as legal financial obligations, these economic sanctions 
 
 51. See JAMES JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 93 (2015) (claiming 
that while scholars and media focus on America’s disproportionate use of 
incarceration, the “vast majority of convicted misdemeanants are not 
incarcerated; even the majority of convicted felons are not sentenced to prison”); 
Natapoff, supra note 39, at 1057 (describing how misdemeanor charges represent 
approximately four-fifths of the cases in state courts and impact 10 million 
Americans annually); Jason Furman & Sandra Black, Fines, Fees, and Bail: An 
Overlooked Part of the Criminal Justice System That Disproportionately Impacts 
the Poor, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Dec. 3, 2015, 12:15 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jason-furman/fines-fees-and-bail-an-ov_b_8702912 
.html [https://perma.cc/NQB7-FKAB] (stating that criminal justice reforms should 
not be limited to mass incarceration as reform is also necessary to address 
“regressive monetary punishments”). 
 52. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
 53. RACHEL L. MCLEAN & MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’T 
JUSTICE CENT., REPAYING DEBTS 3 (2007), http://victimsofcrime.org/docs/default-
source/restitution-toolkit/repaying_debts_full_report.pdf?sfvrsn=2 
[https://perma.cc/R6QW-BED4] (recognizing that “many individuals . . . pass 
through the court system and owe substantial financial obligations but have not 
been sentenced to prison or jail”). 
 54. JACOBS, supra note 51, at 1 (claiming that “federal and state criminal 
repositories contain criminal records for approximately 25 percent of the U.S. 
adult population”); Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, 
Americans Find Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 
10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-find-
consequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402 [https://perma.cc/6ZFZ-WZ8T] 
(claiming that “the FBI currently has 77.7 million individuals on file in its master 
criminal database—or nearly one out of every three American adults”). 
 55. JACOBS, supra note 51, at 94. 
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can be assessed at any stage in the process from pre-conviction 
to sentencing to incarceration to probation or supervision.56 
The charges include fines, restitution, bail, and fees.57 
Additionally, the charges may be described as assessments, 
surcharges, or sanctions.58 Purported justifications for the 
charges include punishment, deterrence, victim compensation, 
and reimbursement.59 Child support obligations that accrue 
during incarceration are also a significant and growing concern 
for many indigent inmates, but they are beyond the scope of 
this Article.60 Likewise, restitution, which has traditionally 
focused on the compensation of victims, is a significant 
financial burden faced by criminal defendants and is also 
beyond the reach of this Article.61 Instead, this Article will 
primarily focus on abuses related to the collection of bail, fines, 
and fees. 
On any given day, over 450,000 people in the United States 
are incarcerated without having been convicted of an offense.62 
 
 56. Katherine Beckett & Naomi Murakawa, Mapping the Shadow Carceral 
State: Toward an Institutionally Capacious Approach to Punishment, 16 
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 221, 227 (2012), http://tcr.sagepub.com/content/16/2/ 
221 [https://perma.cc/5SGR-HU49]. 
 57. Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 4, at 498–504 (providing a more 
detailed development of the components and history of criminal justice debt). For 
a state-by-state listing of examples of fines and fees, see ALEXES HARRIS, A 
POUND OF FLESH 28–41 tbl.2.4 (2016). 
 58. MCLEAN & THOMPSON, supra note 53, at 2. 
 59. Kirsten D. Levingston & Vicki Turetsky, Debtors’ Prison—Prisoners’ 
Accumulation of Debt as a Barrier to Reentry, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POV. L. 
& POL’Y 187, 188 (2007). 
 60. Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the 
Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 349 (2012). Professor 
Cammett discusses the impact of child support obligations incurred during 
incarceration on re-entry and the right to vote. Id. at 384–86. See also DOUGLAS 
N. EVANS, JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEBT PENALTY: EXPOSING 
THE FINANCIAL BARRIERS TO OFFENDER REINTEGRATION 5–6 (2014), 
https://www.prisonfellowship.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/The-Debt-
Penalty_John-Jay_August-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/WBM4-UXVJ] (describing 
survey results that inmates rank the need for child support assistance higher 
than employment or housing assistance); MITALI NAGRECHA, MARY FAINSOD 
KATZENSTEIN & ESTELLE DAVIS, CTR. FOR CMTY. ALTS., FIRST PERSON ACCOUNTS 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS, FINING THE FAMILY 28 (2015), 
http://communityalternatives.org/pdf/Criminal-Justice-Debt.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
7AQ7-X3UZ] (“Paying thousands of dollars in accumulated child support arrears 
from prison is not only unimaginable, but impossible.”). 
 61. Cortney E. Lollar, What is Criminal Restitution?, 100 IOWA L. REV. 93, 
101–05 (2014) (discussing the evolution of criminal restitution from disgorgement 
of defendant’s unjust enrichment to compensation for victim’s losses). 
 62. PETER WAGNER & BERNADETTE RABUY, MASS INCARCERATION: THE 
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Instead, they are in jail because they have either been denied 
bail or, as in the vast majority of cases, they are unable to 
make a bail payment.63 The imposition of bail impacts the 
release of an arrested individual before trial.64 The purported 
purposes include preventing flight risk and reducing danger to 
society.65 The goal is to set bail at a rate which is not punitive 
but will encourage defendants to appear at trial.66 However, 
bail is often set based solely on the alleged offense without 
regard to the individual’s ability to pay.67 
Fines are assessed as a part of sentencing and are typically 
associated with a punitive or deterrent rationale.68 The hope is 
that the amount of the fine will not only sufficiently punish 
current offenders but also deter potential future offenders from 
committing the offense. Fines are often used as a supplement 
to imprisonment.69 Additionally, fines are increasingly 
becoming the sole sanction for many misdemeanors, including 
traffic violations.70 While statutes or rules may set forth 
certain mandatory fines, judges also have considerable 
discretion in setting other fine amounts.71 
Fees are generally thought of as a method of 
reimbursement.72 For purposes of this Article, fees also include 
 
WHOLE PIE 2016 (2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2016.html 
[https://perma.cc/AFD2-3PZT] (chart reflecting that 451,000 of the 646,000 
inmates in local jails are not convicted). 
 63. Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/U8PB-JYBD]. 
 64. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 1. 
 65. Id. See also Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 
90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 503–13 (2012) (describing the development of the use of 
dangerousness standard for determining pretrial release). 
 66. Shaila Dewan, When Bail is out of Defendant’s Reach, Other Costs Mount, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/11/us/when-bail-is-
out-of-defendants-reach-other-costs-mount.html [https://perma.cc/C8RK-6KAC]; 
Furman & Black, supra note 51. 
 67. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 7; Furman & Black, supra 
note 51. 
 68. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 1. 
 69. Michael Tonry & Mary Lynch, Intermediate Sanctions, 20 CRIME & JUST. 
99, 127 (1996). 
 70. Natapoff, supra note 39, at 1067–71 (discussing the move to fine-only and 
non-jailable misdemeanors as alternatives to incarceration). 
 71. Jessica M. Eaglin, Improving Economic Sanctions in the States, 99 MINN. 
L. REV. 1837, 1849–50 (2015) (describing mandatory fines in Florida, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington). 
 72. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 1 (recognizing that fees 
may also have compensatory, punitive, and deterrent purposes). 
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court costs and surcharges. Recipients of fees include the 
judicial system (courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel), the 
incarceration system (jails and prisons), the supervision system 
(probation and parole companies), and the collection system 
(debt collectors).73 Fees can apply at any stage from pre-
conviction to post-incarceration supervision. Fees may apply 
even when individuals are not convicted.74 As with fines, 
mandatory fees are set by legislation or court rule; however, 
judges often impose additional discretionary fees.75 Moreover, 
fees imposed often fund items that are not directly related to 
the offense or even to the criminal justice system.76 For 
example, fees may go to general fund revenue or specific 
purposes, such as a library or training.77 
B. Growth of Criminal Justice Debt 
While concerns about criminal justice debt date back to the 
1980s, the amount of criminal justice debt has grown 
exponentially in the last thirty years.78 Estimates reflect that 
over ten million individuals in the United States have criminal 
justice debt aggregating over $50 billion and that the amount is 
growing.79 One study of eleven states found a per-state average 
of $178 million in uncollected criminal justice debt.80 
Approximately two-thirds of prisoners have criminal justice 
debt.81 This section will examine mass incarceration and 
budgetary pressures as two likely explanations for the growth 
 
 73. See, e.g., Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Paying for Your Time: How Charging 
Inmates Fees Behind Bars May Violate the Excessive Fines Clause, 15 LOY. J. PUB. 
INT. L. 319, 322 (2014) (identifying that assessments of fees go beyond the courts 
and include prisons and jails). 
 74. See, e.g., SANETA DEVUONO-POWELL, CHRIS SCHWEIDLER, ALICIA 
WALTERS & AZADEH ZOHRABI, ELLA BAKER CENT., FORWARD TOGETHER, 
RESEARCH ACTION DESIGN, WHO PAYS? THE TRUE COST OF INCARCERATION ON 
FAMILIES 14 (2015), http://ellabakercenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/who-
pays.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JJD-EUDF] (public defender fees in Florida and Ohio 
are assessed even when defendants are found not guilty). 
 75. Eaglin, supra, note 71, at 1849–50. 
 76. PEPIN, supra note 3, at 6–8. 
 77. MCLEAN & THOMPSON, supra note 53, at 2. 
 78. Leah A. Plunkett, Captive Markets, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 67–68 (2013). 
See also Mary Fainsod Katzenstein & Mitali Nagrecha, A New Punishment 
Regime, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 555, 556–57 (2011). 
 79. EISEN, CHARGING INMATES, supra note 37, at 1. 
 80. MCLEAN & THOMPSON, supra note 53, at 7. 
 81. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 3. 
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in criminal justice debt. Additionally, it will identify how 
incarceration alternatives may increase the burdens of criminal 
justice debt. 
1. Mass Incarceration and the Growth of Criminal 
Justice Debt 
As incarceration has exploded, so too has the incidence of 
criminal justice debt.82 In 1985, the number of adults 
incarcerated in the United States was approximately 750,000, 
with about 500,000 in prison and 250,000 in jail.83 By 2008, 
incarceration had tripled and reached its peak at over 2.3 
million with more than 1.6 million adults in prison and over 
780,000 adults in jail.84 While recent levels have dropped, more 
than 2.2 million adults are still currently incarcerated.85 
As the United States leads the world in “mass 
incarceration,” it has also become the leader in “mass 
supervision.”86 The over two million people currently subject to 
incarceration represent only about one-third of those under 
correctional control, as an additional 820,000 are subject to 
parole, and 3.8 million are subject to probation.87 The total 
number of adults under correctional supervision (probation, 
parole, jail or prison) is over 6.8 million, reflecting 2.8 percent 
of the population or approximately one in thirty-six adults in 
the U.S.88 In contrast, in 1980, only 1.1 percent of adults were 
subject to correctional supervision.89 
 
 82. Katzenstein & Nagrecha, supra note 78, at 556–57. 
 83. TOM HESTER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
NCJ 103957, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1985, at 6 
tbl1.2 (1987), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus85.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
A2AT-DJ7Q]. 
 84. DANIELLE KAEBLE, LAUREN GLAZE, ANASTASIOS TSOUTIS & TODD 
MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 249513, 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014, at 2 tbl.1 (2015), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus14.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y27U-BB2N]. 
 85. Id. at 2. 
 86. Eaglin, supra note 71, at 1843. Although the United States has the most 
prisoners, Seychelles has recently overtaken the United States to become the 
country with the highest prison population rate. ROY WALMSLEY, INST. FOR 
CRIMINAL POLICY RESEARCH, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 2 (2016), 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/world_prison
_population_list_11th_edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/HTG9-PB5R]. 
 87. WAGNER & RABUY, supra note 62. 
 88. DANIELLE KAEBLE ET AL., supra note 84, at 1. 
 89. TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
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The growth in incarceration, probation, and parole has led 
to increased costs.90 From 1983 to 2012, criminal justice costs 
grew by more than 650 percent.91 One study found that the 
cost of the expansion in the criminal justice system during the 
thirty-year period was $3.4 trillion.92 By 2012, criminal justice 
costs were over $270 billion with “local spending compris[ing] 
approximately half of total expenditures.”93 The annual 
expenditures equate to more than $870 per capita.94 
2. Budgetary Concerns and Growth in Criminal 
Justice Debt 
At the same time that mass incarceration, probation, and 
parole have burdened the criminal justice system with 
increased costs, governments have had to confront declining 
budgets. As mass incarceration reached its peak levels in 2007 
and 2008, the recession hit states and localities resulting in 
reduced tax revenues and funding.95 Rather than increasing 
tax rates, many municipalities sought to pass the costs of the 
criminal justice system on to defendants.96 For example, in 
New Orleans, criminal justice debt “account[s] for almost two-
 
NCJ 156675, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1993, at 1 
(1995), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus93ex.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2UD-
B4CC]. 
 90. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON 
INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10 (2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160423_cea_i
ncarceration_criminal_justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6GH-DWQA]. 
 91. EISEN, supra note 37, at 2. 
 92. COMMUNITIES UNITED ET AL., THE $3.4 TRILLION MISTAKE: THE COST OF 
MASS INCARCERATION AND CRIMINALIZATION, AND HOW JUSTICE REINVESTMENT 
CAN BUILD A BETTER FUTURE FOR ALL 7 (2016), http://www.maketheroad.org/ 
pix_reports/Justice%20Reinvestment%20Final%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
ZJ53-DNVN]. 
 93. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 2. 
 94. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 90, at 10. 
 95. SUZANNE M. KIRCHHOFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF 
PRISON GROWTH 2 (2010), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41177.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7GB7-VUXR]. See also ALEX BENDER ET AL., NOT JUST A 
FERGUSON PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC COURTS DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 12 
(2015), http://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/Not-Just-a-Ferguson-Problem-
How-Traffic-Courts-Drive-Inequality-in-California-4.8.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
LX3X-V4NX] (describing how the 2008 recession led to “unprecedented budget 
cuts” for the California court system); Eaglin, supra note 71, at 1843–44, 1866–67. 
 96. EISEN, supra note 37, at 2. 
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thirds of the criminal court’s general operating budget.”97 
Additionally, many municipalities impose criminal justice debt 
to help overcome general budget deficits unrelated to criminal 
justice services.98 
3. Decriminalization 
Although mass incarceration and budget concerns have 
contributed to the growth in criminal justice debt, efforts to 
reduce incarceration may create unintended consequences by 
increasing the debt burden on indigent defendants.99 Some 
states have increased fees to “offset diminishing funding for 
alternatives to incarceration.”100 In an attempt to reduce 
incarceration, many states are now decriminalizing certain 
misdemeanors by making them fine-only or non-jailable 
offenses.101 With a more streamlined process and providing 
fewer procedural protections than jailable offenses, 
decriminalization has led to a net-widening effect as 
municipalities have expanded coverage and imposed criminal 
justice debt on more individuals.102 
C. Abusive Acts in Collecting Criminal Justice Debt 
Abuses in collection have accompanied the growth of 
criminal justice debt and are expected to increase as debt 
escalates.103 The abuses include the misplaced reliance on 
monetary sanctions as a tool for revenue collection; the failure 
to adequately supervise private parties who perform traditional 
governmental functions in collecting criminal justice debt; the 
failure to take into account ability to pay in imposing criminal 
justice debt and incarcerating defendants; and the 
disproportionate and discriminatory impact on poor and 
minorities. 
 
 97. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S 
NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS 8 (2010), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny_ 
web.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JS8-VLD3]. 
 98. Eaglin, supra note 71, at 1867–68. 
 99. Natapoff, supra note 39, at 1102–04. 
 100. Eaglin, supra note 71, at 1848–49. 
 101. Id. at 1845; Natapoff, supra note 39, at 1067. 
 102. Natapoff, supra note 39, at 1059. 
 103. Furman & Black, supra note 51. 
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1. Focus on Revenue Collection Rather than Public 
Safety 
The March 2015 report on Ferguson described in shocking 
detail a criminal justice system focused more on revenue 
maximization than the protection of public safety.104 
Unfortunately, the experience in Ferguson is neither new nor 
unique.105 The misplaced reliance on profit generation rather 
than public safety creates public mistrust of the government.106 
The over-reliance on revenue collection is most evident in the 
growing and pervasive use of fines and fees by municipalities. 
a. Abusive Use of Fines 
A major criticism of some municipalities is their unfettered 
use of fines to generate revenue.107 Fines have seen a dramatic 
increase in the last few decades. For example, from 1986 to 
2004, the percentage of incarcerated individuals who had also 
received a fine more than tripled.108 Misdemeanor offenses 
have also grown at significant rates, currently representing 
about 80 percent of state court dockets and including over ten 
million non-traffic cases each year.109 As misdemeanors have 
 
 104. FPD REP., supra note 41, at 10. For a more detailed discussion of the 
Ferguson Report and how its conclusions are not limited to Ferguson, Missouri, 
see Sobol, supra note 41. 
 105. Vanita Gupta, Head, Civ. Rights Div., Remarks at the Symposium on the 
Criminalization of Poverty at the University of Michigan Law School (Feb. 19, 
2016), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/head-civil-rights-division-vanita-gupta-
delivers-remarks-symposium-criminalization [https://perma.cc/3P6R-B26C] 
(declaring that the “problem of excessive fines and fees extends well beyond 
Ferguson . . . [and] exists in many of the country’s 6,500 municipal courts”); 
DEVUONO-POWELL ET AL., supra note 74, at 16; Sobol, supra note 41, at 294 n.6. 
 106. Loretta E. Lynch, U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks at White House 
Convening on Incarceration and Poverty (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-delivers-remarks-white-house-
convening-incarceration-and [https://perma.cc/YV36-84G3]. 
 107. Emily Shaw, Where Local Governments Are Paying the Bills with Police 
Fines, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Sept. 26, 2012, 12:02 PM), 
https://sunlightfoundation.com/2016/09/26/where-local-governments-are-paying-
the-bills-with-police-fines/ [https://perma.cc/C9GA-9HCH]. 
 108. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 3 (explaining that 12 
percent of inmates received fines in 1986 and 37 percent of inmates received fines 
in 2004) (citing Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and 
Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1770 
(2010)). 
 109. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320–21 
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increased, economic sanctions accompanying these offenses 
have “ballooned.”110 Fines for these lower-level offenses have 
led to concerns about whether courts are just acting as 
collection agents and whether the economic charges are merely 
a form of taxes.111 
The move towards decriminalization of misdemeanors to 
fine-only offenses also creates the potential for abuse by 
municipalities using criminal justice debt as funding 
sources.112 Under such circumstances, due to net-widening 
effects and lack of procedural protections, more individuals 
become vulnerable to the imposition of fines and fees.113 The 
alternatives to incarceration create opportunities, or “revenue 
traps,” for local governments to generate revenue through new 
fines and fees imposed on defendants.114 
The Ferguson report reflects an emphasis on using fines to 
generate revenue at all stages of the criminal justice process.115 
Police officers were under “pressure . . . to write citations, 
independent of any public safety need”116 and to “fill the 
revenue pipeline.”117 Promotion of police officers was based on 
the number of tickets issued.118 Additionally, daily postings at 
the police station highlighted the top ticket producers.119 In 
response to the city establishing revenue generation as a 
primary goal, the municipal court set fines at levels that were 
either at or near the highest rates in the state, created new 
fines, and worked with city officials to meet revenue targets.120 
For example, the court established a failure to appear fine 
which led to the collection of more than $440,000 in 2013.121 
The DOJ alleges that the court routinely used arrest warrants 
as a collection tool rather than to promote public safety.122 In 
 
(2012). 
 110. Id. at 1326. 
 111. Natapoff, supra note 39, at 1099 (quoting a 2011–12 policy paper from the 
Conference of State Court Administrators). 
 112. Id. at 1100–01. 
 113. Id. at 1059. 
 114. Id. at 1098–1103. 
 115. FPD REP., supra note 41, at 10. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 13. 
 118. Id. at 2. 
 119. Id. at 11. 
 120. Id. at 14. 
 121. Id. at 43. 
 122. Id. at 55. 
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2013, the court issued 33,000 warrants, and “[m]any residents 
were jailed because they could not afford the hundreds of 
dollars in court fines for offenses such as traffic violations.”123 
Excessive use of fines is not limited to Ferguson. Some 
municipalities faced with severe budget issues “ticket 
everything in sight to keep the town functioning.”124 These 
cities encourage law enforcement to issue citations, and the 
“courts are the mechanism for collection.”125 
For example, a study of traffic ticket revenue in Colorado 
found forty towns collecting more than the state’s four percent 
average with the top offender—Campo, Colorado—collecting 93 
percent of its revenue from traffic tickets.126 Similarly, a study 
of North Carolina counties during 1990 to 2003 demonstrated 
that when county revenue decreased in any given year, the 
following year led to a statistically significant increase in 
traffic tickets issued.127 
The use of fines to generate revenue is not limited to traffic 
violations. Cities also fined individuals for staying at a 
boyfriend’s house, having tall grass, wearing saggy pants, or 
failing to sign up for a designated trash collection service.128 
Reports show that as states have begun to put restrictions on 
revenue attributable to traffic fines, municipalities have 
apparently adopted more aggressive use of non-traffic fines.129 
 
 123. DEVUONO-POWELL ET AL., supra note 74, at 16. 
 124. Jack Hitt, Police Shootings Won’t Stop Unless We Also Stop Shaking Down 
Black People, MOTHERJONES.COM (Sept.–Oct. 2015), http://www.motherjones.com/ 
politics/2015/07/police-shootings-traffic-stops-excessive-fines [https://perma.cc/ 
TX9A-29FZ] (quoting William Maurer, an attorney with the Institute for Justice). 
 125. Whitney Benns & Blake Strode, Debtors’ Prison in 21st-Century America, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/ 
02/debtors-prison/462378/ [https://perma.cc/4BYF-ZKT2]. 
 126. Alexa Corcoran, A Handful of Colorado Towns Rely Heavily on Money 
from Traffic Tickets, ROCKY MOUNTAIN PBS NEWS (Oct. 12, 2016, 10:04 PM), 
http://www.rmpbs.org/blogs/news/a-handful-of-colorado-towns-rely-heavily-on-
money-from-traffic-tickets/ [https://perma.cc/EEM7-D89L]. 
 127. Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, Red Ink in the Rearview Mirror: 
Local Fiscal Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets, 52 J.L. & ECON. 71, 72 
(2009) (discussed in COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 2). 
 128. Ryan J. Reilly & Mariah Stewart, Fleece Force: How Police and Courts 
Around Ferguson Bully Residents and Collect Millions, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 26, 
2015, 7:33 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/26/st-louis-county-municipal-
courts_n_6896550.html [https://perma.cc/DFX3-DY5P] (staying at a boyfriend’s house is 
viewed as violation of an occupancy permit). 
 129. Monica Davey, Lawsuit Accuses Missouri City of Fining Homeowners to 
Raise Revenue, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/ 
us/lawsuit-accuses-missouri-city-of-fining-homeowners-to-raise-
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For example, Pagedale and Frontenac, Missouri, saw increases 
in non-traffic arrests of 495 percent and 364 percent, 
respectively, following state-imposed caps on traffic-ticket 
revenues.130 In November 2015, a civil rights class action 
complaint was filed against the City of Pagedale claiming that 
it used its “code enforcement and municipal court[s]” as 
“revenue-generating machines” that “violate[] the Due Process 
and Excessive Fines Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.”131 
Additionally, municipalities are increasingly using new 
technologies to become more aggressive in collecting fines. For 
example, in 2011, 70 percent of agencies reported that they had 
access to electronic license plate readers.132 Port Arthur, Texas, 
is one of many municipalities using the readers to stop and 
arrest motorists with unpaid traffic fines.133 Before the 
readers, officers would apprehend drivers with outstanding 
fines only if the drivers were stopped for other offenses.134 The 
readers now allow police to stop drivers based solely on 
outstanding fines.135 Drivers are often told to “pay up or go to 
jail.”136 With the adoption of the readers, annual ticket revenue 
in Port Arthur surged from $1.2 million to $2.1 million.137 
Additionally, Texas has enacted legislation permitting the use 
of credit and debit card machines in police cars so that police 
 
revenue.html?ref=us&_r=1 [https://perma.cc/Q6PC-9XVB]; Jennifer S. Mann, 
Municipalities Ticket for Trees and Toys, As Traffic Revenue Declines, ST. LOUIS 




 130. Hitt, supra note 124. 
 131. Civil Rights Class Action Complaint ¶ I, Whitner v. City of Pagedale, No. 
14:15-cv-01655, 2016 WL 915303 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 4, 2015), http://ij.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/ECF-1-Complaint-FILE-STAMPED-11.04.15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DP4Q-YJCX]. 
 132. Alex Campbell & Kendall Taggart, The Ticket Machine, BUZZFEED (Jan. 
26, 2016, 8:19 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/alexcampbell/the-ticket-
machine#.kiN209Eaxq [https://perma.cc/74NM-SGXU] (citing POLICE EXEC. 
RESEARCH FORUM, HOW ARE INNOVATIONS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFORMING 
POLICING? 1 (2012), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_ 
Series/how%20are%20innovations%20in%20technology%20transforming%20polici
ng%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD44-6UG7]). 
 133. Campbell & Taggart, supra note 132. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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can collect fines.138 This has led to criticism that police are 
becoming “mobile debt collectors.”139 
b. Abusive Use of Fees 
Fines are often just the tip of the monetary obligation 
iceberg. The fees assessed to defendants, especially for 
misdemeanors, often exceed the penalties for the underlying 
offense.140 For example, California adds $390 in statutory fees 
and assessments to the $100 fine for a minor traffic 
violation.141 Moreover, if the defendant fails to appear in court 
or pay the charge, an additional $325 is added, turning the 
initial charge of $100 into an $815 obligation.142 Florida’s 
system of using fees to fund its courts has been described as 
“cash register justice.”143 From 1996 to 2007, Florida added 
more than twenty categories of fees.144 
Over the last several years, fees have escalated even more 
than fines.145 While fees for criminal defendants date back to 
1846, they have now grown significantly both in number (new 
fees) and in dollar amount.146 Since 2010, all but two states 
and the District of Columbia have increased their criminal 
 
 138. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 103.0025 (b)(2) (West Supp. 2016). 
 139. Dave Maass, “No Cost” License Plate Readers Are Turning Texas Police 
into Mobile Debt Collectors and Data Miners, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: 
DEEPLINKS (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/no-cost-license-
plate-readers-are-turning-texas-police-mobile-debt-collectors-and 
[https://perma.cc/H2VB-Z85R]; Debra Cassens Weiss, Texas Police Turn into 
‘Mobile Debt Collectors’ with License-Reader Program, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 01, 2016, 
06:15 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/texas_police_turn_into_ 
mobile_debt_collectors_with_license_reader_program [https://perma.cc/H9YW-
VGKK]. 
 140. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 14. 
 141. BENDER ET AL., supra note 95, at 9. 
 142. Id. at 10. See also Hitt, supra note 124 (describing how government 
agencies can add fees to fines, converting a $35 fine to a monetary charge of $235). 
 143. REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF 
FLORIDA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES 1 (2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/FloridaF&F.pdf?nocdn=1 [https://perma.cc/25D9-
WUK7]. 
 144. Id. at 1. For more examples of the imposition of multiple fees in 
jurisdictions, see PEPIN, supra note 3, at 6–8. 
 145. Harris et al., supra note 108, at 1769–71; Pat O’Malley, Politicizing the 
Case for Fines, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 547, 548 (2011). 
 146. Eisen, supra note 73, at 319, 322; Tanzina Vega, Costly Prison Fees are 
Putting Inmates Deep in Debt, CNN: MONEY (Sept. 18, 2015), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/18/news/economy/prison-fees-inmates-debt/ 
index.html [https://perma.cc/85HS-NQAW] (quoting Lauren-Brooke Eisen). 
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justice fees.147 Although policies have been developed to reduce 
discretion in sentencing, policies setting forth restrictions on 
legislatures and judges in setting and applying fees are rare.148 
Unfortunately, “the decision to raise or create new user fees is 
rarely made with much deliberation or thought about the 
consequences.”149 
Fees are now imposed in many jurisdictions at every stage 
in the process.150 For example, at the pre-conviction stage, 
defendants may be billed for the issuance of a warrant, lab 
testing, and monitoring devices.151 At least forty-three states 
assess application fees for public defender services.152 At 
sentencing, charges may include court costs, and mandatory 
fees imposed by the state, as well as discretionary fees.153 
Additionally, for those incarcerated, at least forty-three states 
charge for room and board, and thirty-five states charge for 
medical care.154 Inmates may be charged for services provided 
including toilet paper, uniforms, and telephone calls.155 Fees 
for prisoners have increased dramatically, as, in 1991, about 
one-quarter had fees at the end of their term while currently 
 
 147. State-by-State Court Fees, NPR (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312455680/state-by-state-court-fees 
[https://perma.cc/9JDR-FX8T]. 
 148. Eaglin, supra note 71, at 1856. 
 149. ALICIA BANNON, MITALI NAGRECHA & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 4 (2010), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/QF87-28LA]. 
 150. Lauren-Brooke Eisen & Jessica Eaglin, Poverty, Incarceration, and 
Criminal Justice Debt, TALK POVERTY: JUSTICE (Dec. 2, 2014, 8:00 AM), 
http://talkpoverty.org/2014/12/02/criminal-justice-debt/ [https://perma.cc/BLC4-
Q3BE]. 
 151. RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S 
FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 50 n.50 (2015), 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/incarcerations-front-
door-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4XY-APN2]. 
 152. Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, The Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR 
(May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-
court-fees-punish-the-poor [https://perma.cc/U9NT-B6EJ]; State-by-State Court 
Fees, supra note 147. 
 153. Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1175, 1190–91. 
 154. EISEN, supra note 37, at 4. The Brennan Center has compiled an 
interactive map that reflects state-by-state charges for room and board or medical 
fees. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, IS CHARGING INMATES TO STAY IN PRISON 
SMART POLICY, https://www.brennancenter.org/states-pay-stay-charges (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5ME8-KBSH]. 
 155. Eisen & Eaglin, supra note 150. 
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more than three-quarters have fees when leaving prison.156 
Additionally, at least forty-four states impose charges for 
probation and parole services, and forty-nine states impose fees 
for monitoring devices.157 From 1999 to 2009, the number of 
individuals under electronic monitoring increased from 
approximately 75,000 to over 200,000.158 Often, municipalities 
use fees as a method of funding non-criminal justice 
programs.159 
Decriminalization of misdemeanors can also result in 
increased fees, as alternatives to incarceration include 
“supervisory, educational, or treatment” requirements and, in 
turn, defendants are charged fees for these services.160 
Defendants in alternative programs are often charged 
participation fees. For example, probationers in Rutherford 
County are charged a fee of $132 to participate in trash pickup 
as community service.161 Similarly, Pennsylvania law requires 
defendants pay at least $60 to be eligible for parole or 
probation.162 
2. Outsourcing to Private Companies 
Unfortunately, collection abuses are not limited to 
governmental entities involved in the criminal justice system. 
The outsourcing of traditional governmental functions to 
private for-profit companies has created heightened concerns 
regarding the abusive collection of criminal justice debt. 
Outsourcing is apparent in the growing use of private firms for 
 
 156. Eaglin, supra note 71, at 1852. 
 157. Shapiro, supra note 152; State-by-State Court Fees, supra note 147. 
 158. Greg Beato, The Lighter Side of Electronic Monitoring, REASON (May 24, 
2012), https://reason.com/archives/2012/05/24/the-lighter-side-of-electronic-
monitorin [https://perma.cc/EAN2-3J8Z]. 
 159. PEPIN, supra note 3, at 6–8. 
 160. Natapoff, supra note 39, at 1086–87. 
 161. Kim Bellware, Judge Says You Can’t Lock Up People on Probation for Being 
Poor, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 21, 2015, 7:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
entry/poverty-jailingMe-probation-rutherford-county_56785da5e4b06fa6887e31e1 
[https://perma.cc/525L-NL39]. 
 162. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11.1101 (West 2015). See also 
BANNON ET AL., supra note 149, at 20 (discussing the statute); Daniel Craig, 
WATCH: Pennsylvania Parole Fee Scrutinized by John Oliver, PHILLY VOICE 
(Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.phillyvoice.com/watch-pa-parole-fee-scrutinized-john-
oliver/ [https://perma.cc/S9BX-6ZYN] (discussing how John Oliver highlighted the 
provision in an episode of HBO’s Last Week Tonight). 
8. 88.4 SOBOL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2017  4:11 PM 
866 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
prisons, probation, and collection.163 Additionally, private 
businesses are often used to provide services such as medical 
care and telephone to incarcerated individuals.164 Moreover, 
the vast majority of states allow private bail companies.165 
More than 1,000 courts in at least twelve states use private 
probation companies to monitor misdemeanor defendants.166 
The probation companies are attractive to cash-strapped 
municipalities, as they often provide cities an “‘offender-funded’ 
business model.”167 Under this zero-cost solution for 
municipalities, probation companies receive all of their income 
from fees recovered from probationers.168 
Often the fees charged by the companies are not regulated, 
leading to abuses.169 Concerns about private probation 
companies have been the subject of litigation throughout the 
country.170 Additionally, proposed federal legislation threatens 
 
 163. Beckett & Harris, supra note 36, at 513. 
 164. HARRIS, supra note 57, at 10. $2.9 billion is the estimated annual 
payment to private companies for food and telephone services for the incarcerated. 
PETER WAGNER & BERNADETTE RABUY, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, FOLLOWING 
THE MONEY OF MASS INCARCERATION (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/money.html [https://perma.cc/3RMP-D25H]. 
 165. THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 214994, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY 
DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 4 (2007), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/prfdsc.pdf [https://perma.cc/FP45-JDYE] (describing use of commercial bail 
agents in forty-six states). Private bail companies typically charge defendants a 
fee equal to 10 percent of the bail amount and may require collateral from 
defendants. Id. In return for the fee, the bail company will post a 
surety/appearance bond. Id. Annually, bail companies receive $1.4 billion in 
nonrefundable fees. WAGNER & RABUY, supra note 164. 
 166. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 1, 12 n.3 (listing Alabama, 
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Tennessee, Utah, and Washington, and stating that these states are not 
“necessarily an exhaustive list of all states where the industry exists”). 
 167. Id. at 15. 
 168. Id. 
 169. DEVUONO-POWELL ET AL., supra note 74, at 15. 
 170. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., 
Inc., No. 3:15-cv-01048 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 1, 2015), http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/ 
wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/complaint_file_stamped.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
A2QR-7Z48] [hereinafter PCC Complaint]; Complaint, Reynolds v. Judicial Corr. 
Servs., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00161-MHT-CSC (M.D. Ala. Mar. 12, 2015), 
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/case/1_-_ 
complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6AR-6GWV]; Complaint, Thompson v. Dekalb 
Cty., No. 1:15-mi-99999-UNA (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/ 
default/files/assets/2015.01.29_filed_thompson_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
JZY7-PEST]; First Amended Class Action Complaint, Mitchell v. City of 
Montgomery, No. 2:14-cv-00186-MEF-CSC (M.D. Ala. May 23, 2014), 
http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Complaint.pdf 
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to reduce federal funding for states and municipalities that rely 
on private probation companies.171 
Probationers’ experiences in Kentucky reflect some of the 
concerns over the use of private probation companies, where 
they are subject to monitoring fees only if they live in counties 
serviced by private companies.172 The firms operate without 
any written agreements or any supervision by the state.173 
Although counties do not keep records of people under private 
probation, Kentucky Alternative Programs is suspected to be 
the state’s largest private probation company, monitoring 
about 8,000 defendants in thirty-eight counties.174 Concerns 
have surfaced over contributions by its officers and directors to 
judicial campaigns as well as the failure to verify whether the 
companies are complying with court rules requiring that fees 
be adjusted based on ability to pay.175 
Sentinel Offender Services, a private probation company, 
involved in the Barrett case described in the Introduction, has 
been accused of requiring probationers to take drug tests even 
when the courts have not ordered the tests.176 A recent lawsuit 
suggests that Sentinel required the non-court ordered tests as 
a way of collecting additional fees.177 
Similar concerns exist in Tennessee, where a federal 
corruption lawsuit has been filed against Rutherford County 
and Providence Community Corrections (PCC), a private 
probation company.178 The complaint alleges that the county 
 
[https://perma.cc/D92P-VSAA]; Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC v. Glover, 766 
S.E.2d 456, 460 (Ga. 2014). 
 171. End of Debtor’s Prison Act of 2017, H.R. 1724, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 172. James McNair, Inside Kentucky’s Unregulated Private Probation Industry, 
KY. CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Jan. 20, 2016), http://kycir.org/2016/01/ 
20/inside-kentuckys-unregulated-private-probation-industry/# [https://perma.cc/ 
3UBK-XB7H]. 
 173. Id. (stating that “[n]o state agency monitors the monitors”). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Kate Brumback, Lawsuit: Private Probation Company Forced Illegal Drug 
Tests, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 
2016/feb/17/lawsuit-private-probation-company-forced-illegal-d/ [https://perma.cc/ 
9R7D-MAF9]. 
 177. Complaint ¶ 1, Luse v. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, No. 2:16-mi-99999-
UNA (N.D. Ga. Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.schr.org/files/post/files/LUSE% 
20v%20%20SENTINEL%20OFFENDER%20SERVICES.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8U6G-JRG8]. 
 178. PCC Complaint, supra note 170. See Alysia Santo, How to Fight Modern-
Day Debtors’ Prisons? Sue the Courts., MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 1, 2015, 2:45 
PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/10/01/how-to-fight-modern-day-
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and PCC have operated a racketeering enterprise to extort 
money from indigent individuals by threatening incarceration 
for failure to pay criminal justice debt.179 PCC’s revenues are 
based solely on fees collected from individuals on probation.180 
PCC allegedly added monthly charges, fees for drug tests 
administered at PCC’s discretion (even if the underlying 
offense was not drug-related), pictures, and classes.181 
Probationers were allegedly required to sign a document that 
required them, among other things, to allow warrantless 
searches of their homes, vehicles, and persons by PCC, to obey 
orders of PCC officers, and to pay all PCC fees.182 PCC 
allegedly told probationers that failure to comply with any of 
these requirements could result in revocation of probation, 
arrest, or incarceration for months.183 PCC failed to inform 
probationers that they had rights to have payments modified 
and could not be incarcerated without an ability-to-pay 
determination.184 PCC allegedly even discouraged indigency 
waivers and purportedly told probationers that they would 
have to pay $25 to seek indigency relief.185 Additionally, PCC 
reportedly applied payments to its fees first rather than court 
debts, so that typically the court debt was only minimally 
reduced and probationers would remain under probation due to 
outstanding court debt.186 
Another area where private companies offer free services 
in exchange for the right to collect fees from the public is the 
use of high-speed cameras for reading license plates. Vigilant 
Solutions, Inc. provides “no cost” license plate readers to Texas 
law enforcement and receives its revenues from a 25 percent 
fee added to defendants’ fines.187 Police use the readers to 
identify drivers with outstanding criminal justice debt. Officers 
give drivers  the option to pay the outstanding debt and 
Vigilant Solution’s fee by credit or debit card, or face arrest.188 
 
debtors-prisons-sue-the-courts [https://perma.cc/BQN5-QZSG]. 
 179. PCC Complaint, supra note 170, at 1–3. 
 180. Id. ¶¶ 1, 16, 18. 
 181. Id. ¶ 20. 
 182. Id. ¶ 21. 
 183. Id. ¶¶ 21, 24. 
 184. Id. ¶¶ 29, 36. 
 185. Id. ¶ 36. 
 186. Id. ¶¶ 26–27. 
 187. Weiss, supra note 139. 
 188. Id. (describing Vigilant Solutions’s role in Kyle, Texas). 
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Failure to pay can also result in towing and impound fees.189 
3. Failure to Take into Account Ability to Pay 
A significant problem shared by bail, fines, and fees is that 
they are often imposed without taking into account a 
defendant’s ability to pay, leaving those unable to pay with the 
threat of incarceration.190 As a result, while mass incarceration 
has been associated with an increase in criminal justice debt, 
an increase in criminal justice debt has also led to more 
incarceration as individuals are incarcerated not for their 
underlying offenses, but for their inability to pay criminal 
justice debt.191 
a. Incarceration for Inability to Pay Bail 
Although monetary bail was initially set up as a way of 
allowing individuals to be released before trial, in modern 
times, it has become a way of locking up indigent individuals 
and coercing them to accept plea bargains.192 According to one 
report “[m]oney, or the lack thereof, is now the most important 
factor in determining whether someone is held in jail 
pretrial.”193 Since 1990, the use of monetary bail has increased 
dramatically.194 For example, a Bureau of Justice Statistics 
report found that the use of bail for felony defendants in large 
urban counties increased from approximately 50 percent in 
1990 to over 70 percent in 2009.195 Additionally, between 1992 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 1; Furman & Black, supra 
note 51. 
 191. EISEN, CHARGING INMATES, supra note 37, at 2 (describing “how current 
practices of charging inmates perpetuates mass incarceration”). 
 192. ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN DIMINO, NAT’L 
ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE 
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 8, 19–20 (2009); 
Pinto, supra note 63. A complete history of the development of the bail system is 
beyond the scope of this Article. For more detailed information, see TIMOTHY R. 
SCHNACKE, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL 
21–44 (2014), http://static.nicic.gov/UserShared/2014-11-05_final_bail_ 
fundamentals_september_8,_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QT6-JAJ3]. 
 193. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 151, at 32. 
 194. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 90, at 49 (asserting that “the use 
of bail bonds has also increased by more than 130 percent over the past two 
decades”). 
 195. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 6. 
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and 2009, judges increased bail in felony cases by more than 40 
percent.196 The growth in pretrial detention has surpassed the 
growth of imprisonment as the 59 percent growth rate in 
“unconvicted” individuals in jail from 1996 to 2014 nearly 
doubled the 32 percent growth rate for prison inmates.197 The 
jailing of unconvicted defendants accounts for 99 percent of the 
increase in jail inmates over the last fifteen years.198 More 
than 50 percent of unconvicted inmates remain in jail for at 
least thirty days.199 Many plead guilty to a petty offense simply 
to get out of jail and take advantage of time served.200 As a 
result, they wind up with criminal records.201 Additionally, 
many spend more time in jail awaiting trial than the maximum 
sentence they could receive for their offenses.202 As a report by 
the VERA Institute suggests, “[t]hese cases, in particular, turn 
our ideals about justice upside down. . . . [T]he system punishes 
these individuals while they are presumed to be innocent, and 
then releases them once they are found guilty.”203 
Moreover, studies have also found that pretrial detention 
adversely impacts both plea bargaining and sentencing. 
Defendants in jail are less likely to help with their defense by 
securing witnesses or evidence.204 They are also more likely to 
accept a plea bargain with a longer sentence. Additionally, they 
are more likely to be ultimately sentenced to incarceration and 
more likely to receive a longer prison term than those who can 
pay bail.205 A study of over 153,000 defendants jailed in 
Kentucky between July 2009 and June 2010 found that 
“[d]etained defendants are over four times more likely to be 
sentenced to jail and over three times more likely to be 
 
 196. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 151, at 29. 
 197. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 7 & n.11. 
 198. Peter Wagner, Jails Matter. But Who is Listening?, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Aug. 14, 2015), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/08/14/ 
jailsmatter/ [https://perma.cc/JD33-5F7Q]. 
 199. Natapoff, supra note 109, at 1322. 
 200. Id. at 1322; Dewan, supra note 66. 
 201. Dewan, supra note 66. 
 202. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 151, at 34; Dewan, supra note 66. 
 203. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 151, at 34. 
 204. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 8. 
 205. Id. (citing CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, MARIE VANNOSTRAND & 
ALEXANDER HOLSINGER, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., INVESTIGATING THE 
IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON SENTENCING OUTCOMES (2013), 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_state-
sentencing_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/L45K-4KLN]). 
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sentenced to prison than defendants who are released at some 
point pending trial.”206 Additionally, jail terms are almost three 
times greater, and prison terms are more than two times longer 
for defendants not released pretrial.207 A New York study had 
similar results reporting that “pretrial detention was the single 
greatest predictor of conviction.”208 The disparities are even 
more significant for low-risk defendants.209 
Bail is typically set without a determination of ability to 
pay.210 The system of cash bail has been the subject of criticism 
for almost one hundred years.211 Calls for reform seek abolition 
of cash bail programs.212 New Jersey, for example, following a 
constitutional amendment, enacted legislation, effective 
January 1, 2017, to determine pretrial release using risk 
assessment rather than money bail.213 Additionally, lawsuits 
have been filed questioning the constitutionality of certain cash 
bail systems, including those that rely on fixed schedules that 
fail to take into account ability to pay.214 Bail should be based 
 
 206. LOWENKAMP ET AL., supra note 205, at 3. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Pinto, supra note 63. 
 209. LOWENKAMP ET AL., supra note 205, at 4. 
 210. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 7; Furman & Black, supra 
note 51. 
 211. Alexander Shalom, Bail Reform as a Mass Incarceration Reduction 
Technique, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 923–24 (2014). 
 212. See, e.g., Press Release, Pretrial Justice Inst., New Ferguson-Inspired 
Campaign Launches to End Cash Bail, Reduce Arrests, and Cut Pretrial 
Detentions in 20 States by 2020 (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.pretrial.org/new-
ferguson-inspired-campaign-launches-to-end-cash-bail-reduce-arrests-and-cut-
pretrial-detentions-in-20-states-by-2020/ [https://perma.cc/LVZ4-V535]. 
 213. See Robert Ramsey, New Bail Procedures—Criminal Justice Reform, 51 
N.J. PRAC. SERIES, MUN. CT. PRAC. MANUAL § 9:3 (2016–2017 ed. 2016). The New 
Jersey constitutional amendment was adopted in 2014. N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶11. 
For a description of reforms in other jurisdictions, see Sara Dorn, New Jersey 
Begins Overhaul of Bail System: Justice for All, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 18, 2017, 
11:05 AM), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/01/new_jersey_begins_ 
overhaul_of.html [https://perma.cc/2FP3-GTBQ]. 
 214. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint at 1–2, Varden v. City of Clanton, No. 
2:15-cv-00034- MHT-WC (M.D. Ala. Jan. 15, 2015). The DOJ filed a statement of 
interest in Varden asserting that a fixed bail system that did not take into 
account ability to pay was unconstitutional. Statement of Interest at 1, Varden v. 
City of Clanton, No. 2:15-cv-00034-MHT-WC (M.D. Ala. Feb. 13, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/file/340461/download [https://perma.cc/HY3F-U386]. 
Subsequently, the City changed its bail policies and a settlement was reached in 
the lawsuit. Jones v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15-cv34-MHT, 2015 WL 5387219, at *1 
(M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015). For a description of the lawsuits filed by Equal Justice 
Under Law seeking to end cash bail systems, see Ending the American Money 
Bail System, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/ 
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on risk to the public and the probability of appearing at court, 
rather than as a method of punishing or raising revenue.215 
b. Arrest and Incarceration for Inability to Pay 
Fees and Fines 
Just as the inability to pay bail results in incarceration, 
inability to pay fees and fines can also lead to incarceration. 
The failure to take into account ability to pay is especially 
troublesome when the failure to pay results in arrest or loss of 
liberty.216 Incarceration under these circumstances often 
violates constitutional, statutory, and rule provisions that 
require an assessment of ability to pay.217 For example, in 
1983, the United States Supreme Court held that revoking 
probation and incarcerating an individual without taking into 
account ability to pay and alternative sentencing “would be 
contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”218 
While courts are generally required to take into account 
ability to pay before incarcerating, many do not.219 Even when 
ability-to-pay hearings are held, courts often lack guidance on 
the standards to apply and when to apply them, leading to 
conflicting results.220 Additionally, individuals are typically not 
represented by counsel at such hearings.221 In these situations, 
 
wp/current-cases/ending-the-american-money-bail-system (last visited Apr. 3, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/4VUM-7YLF]. See also Santo, supra note 178 (describing 
how the lawsuits have led to municipalities in Alabama, Missouri, Mississippi, 
and Louisiana ending cash bail for misdemeanors and traffic violations). 
 215. SCHNACKE, supra note 192, at 64–65. 
 216. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 1; Furman & Black, supra 
note 51. 
 217. Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 4, at 504–07. 
 218. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983). For a more detailed 
discussion of Bearden and related cases, see Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 
4, at 504–07. 
 219. Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 4, at 513. 
 220. Eaglin, supra, note 71, at 1854–55 (describing how states fail to “provide 
meaningful standards or methodologies for ability-to-pay determinations”). 
 221. Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 4, at 514; See, e.g., AM. CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION OF N.H., DEBTORS’ PRISONS IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 1–2 (2015), 
http://aclu-nh.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Final-ACLU-Debtors-Prisons-
Report-9.23.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JCW-L6US] (finding that in 2013 New 
Hampshire judges failed to conduct meaningful ability-to-pay hearings or provide 
defendants with counsel when incarcerating nearly 150 defendants who were 
unable to pay fines); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF TEX., NO EXIT, TEXAS: 
MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS AND THE POVERTY TRAP 6–7 (2016), 
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indigent defendants become trapped in modern-day debtors’ 
prisons.222 Investigations and reports have described the 
growing incidence and problems of modern-day debtors’ 
prisons.223 Additionally, class-action lawsuits have been filed 
alleging debtors’ prisons in municipalities throughout the 
United States.224 
As a practical matter, efforts to incarcerate individuals for 
failure to pay are often counterproductive, creating greater 
expenses for municipalities than they ever recover in 
collection.225 
4. Disproportionate Impact on Low-Income 
Populations 
It should come as no surprise that the imposition of 
monetary charges without consideration of ability to pay 
disproportionately impacts the poor. By their very nature, fixed 
financial charges have a regressive effect on those with lower 
 
https://www.aclutx.org/sites/default/files/no_exit_texas_-_modern-day_debtors_pri 
sons_and_the_poverty_trap_11-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/66JZ-M6JE] (finding 
courts generally fail to conduct proper ability-to-pay hearings, to appoint counsel, 
and to consider payment alternatives). 
 222. See Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 4 (describing the use of modern-
day debtors’ prisons to collect criminal justice debt and comparing them to 
traditional debtor’s prisons in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). 
 223. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEB., Unequal Justice: Bail and 
Modern Day Debtors’ Prisons in Nebraska (2016), https://www.aclunebraska.org/ 
sites/default/files/field_documents/unequal_justice_2016_12_13.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PVK7-ZCL6]; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.H., supra note 
221; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF TEX., supra note 221; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION OF WASH. & COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons: The 
Ways Court-Imposed Debts Punish People for Being Poor (2014), https://www.aclu-
wa.org/sites/default/files/media-legacy/attachments/Modern%20Day%20Debtor% 
27s%20Prison%20Final%20%283%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FDN-ECC8]. 
 224. See Joseph Shapiro, Lawsuits Target ‘Debtors’ Prisons’ Across the Country, 
NPR (Oct. 21, 2015, 4:36 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/21/450546542/lawsuits-
target-debtors-prisons-across-the-country [https://perma.cc/SNF2-EFLD]. For a 
description of the lawsuits filed by Equal Justice Under Law alleging debtors’ 
prisons in Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Alabama, see EQUAL JUSTICE 
UNDER LAW, Shutting Down Debtors’ Prison, http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/ 
wp/current-cases/ending-debtors-prisons/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/4LMV-WWVH]. 
 225. Eaglin, supra, note 71, at 1852. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF 
N.H., supra note 221, at 7 (finding that in 2013 the costs of incarcerating 
defendants who were unable to pay fines was approximately $167,000 and the 
state failed to collect nearly $76,000 in unpaid fines). 
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income levels.226 Revenue generation through fines and fees 
also tends to be greater in poorer municipalities, as they 
generally have fewer available income resources than wealthier 
cities.227 Analysis of reports from Oakland, California reflects 
that the police disproportionately use automatic license plate 
readers in lower-income neighborhoods.228 Additionally, an 
alarming trend is the criminalization of poverty, as certain 
offenses, such as homelessness, apply only to those who lack 
financial resources.229 
Those unable to pay initial monetary amounts often face 
additional financial charges, referred to by critics as poverty 
penalties as the additional charges would not exist if payment 
was made up front. These penalties can take the form of 
interest, late payments, installment plan charges, and 
collection fees.230 A study of fifteen states with the highest 
prison populations found that fourteen of the states used 
poverty penalties.231 At least nine of these states had 
municipalities that assessed fees for installment plans.232 
Washington State imposes a statutory interest fee of 12 percent 
and annual collection charges of $100 per year.233 In some 
jurisdictions, unpaid criminal debt obligations are referred to 
 
 226. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 1. 
 227. Benns & Strode, supra note 125. 
 228. Jeremy Gillula & David Maass, What You Can Learn from Oakland’s Raw 
ALPR Data, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS (Jan. 21, 2015), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/what-we-learned-oakland-raw-alpr-data 
[https://perma.cc/622J-S8NG]. 
 229.  See, e.g., TONY ROBINSON & ALLISON SICKLES, NO RIGHT TO REST: 
CRIMINALIZING HOMELESSNESS IN COLORADO (2015), http://www.cpr.org/sites/ 
default/files/homelessness-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3KD-4R7Q]. A detailed 
analysis of the criminalization of poverty is beyond the scope of this Article. For 
more information, see KAREN DOLAN & JODI L. CARR, INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES, 
THE POOR GET PRISON: THE ALARMING SPREAD OF THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
POVERTY (2015), http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/IPS-The-Poor-
Get-Prison-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PKY-MFRJ]; Kaaryn Gustafson, The 
Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2009) (discussing 
criminalization of welfare recipients). 
 230. BANNON ET AL., supra note 149, at 1. 
 231. Id. 
 232. DILLER, supra note 143, at 15. 
 233. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF WASH. & COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., supra 
note 223, at 4; WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090 (2015) (tying the interest rate to the 
rate used for civil judgments). A procedure for seeking waiver of this interest does 
exist. See Legal Financial Obligation (LFO), WASHINGTONLAWHELP.ORG, 
http://www.washingtonlawhelp.org/issues/consumer-debt/legal-financial-
obligations-restitution-reduc-1 (last visited Apr. 3, 2017) [https://perma.cc/L2L3-
749A]. 
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private collection companies that impose additional fees of up 
to 40 percent of the original debt.234 
Cash bail also has a disparate impact on indigent 
defendants. While wealthier defendants have the ability to post 
bail and in return receive a full refund when they appear in 
court, poorer defendants are often unable to pay bail or wind 
up using a bonding company and having to pay a non-
refundable charge of 10 to 15 percent of the bail.235 
Imposing monetary charges on inmates is especially severe 
on the poor as more than 80 percent of jailed inmates are 
indigent.236 One study found that the average amount of fines 
and fees incurred by those incarcerated exceeds $13,600.237 
This amount exceeds the annual income of more than two-
thirds of those in jail.238 Unable to pay charges for medical 
services, inmates often refuse medical treatment, resulting in 
the spread of diseases to other prisoners, correctional 
employees, and visitors.239 
The poor are also subject to “pay-only probations” in which 
the only reason for the probation is the inability to pay the 
criminal justice debt upfront.240 Those who can pay are not 
subject to supervision.241 Most of the cases handled by private 
probation companies are pay-only probation matters.242 
Lower income individuals often wind up in an endless cycle 
of criminal justice debt facing the threat of arrest and 
incarceration for failure to pay.243 The fear of detention or 
incarceration for failure to pay can cause people to avoid going 
 
 234. DILLER, supra note 143, at 21. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF TEX., 
supra note 221, at 2 (describing how collection agencies in Texas can charge a fee 
of 30 percent for collecting unpaid criminal justice debt). 
 235. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 7. 
 236. EISEN, CHARGING INMATES, supra note 37, at 4. See Eisen, supra note 73, 
at 340 (arguing that “it is unreasonable to require population whose debt to 
society is already being paid by the sentences imposed, 80 percent of whom are 
indigent, to chip in to foot the bill”). 
 237. DEVUONO-POWELL ET AL., supra note 74, at 9. 
 238. Id. at 11 (stating that “over two-thirds of those in jail reported incomes of 
less than $12,000 per year”). 
 239. EISEN, CHARGING INMATES, supra note 37, at 4 (describing how the 
release and detention of inmates who often  are “double and triple bunked in a 
cell” contribute to the transmission of illness). 
 240. Natapoff, supra note 39, at 1100. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. HARRIS, supra note 57, at 3. 
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to public places or seeking medical care or police help.244 Some 
defendants have admitted that, faced with the threat of arrest 
or incarceration for criminal justice debt, they have even 
committed crimes to obtain funds to repay criminal justice 
debt.245 
Additionally, the collateral consequences on the poor 
arising from criminal justice debt are severe.246 Such 
consequences include the inability to obtain financing, secure 
employment, and pay for necessities.247 Many states suspend 
driver’s licenses for failure to pay criminal justice debt, 
impacting the ability of individuals to obtain and maintain 
employment.248 One study found that over 40 percent of 
individuals lost their jobs due to a suspension of their driver’s 
licenses.249 
Texas’s Driver Responsibility Program, established in 
2003, imposes annual fees on the driver’s license of those 
convicted of certain traffic offenses and suspends licenses until 
such fees are paid.250 A report found that the program not only 
negatively impacted families but also safety.251 The program 
 
 244. Natapoff, supra note 39, at 1093–94. 
 245. See Jasmine Burnett, This New Documentary Features President Obama 
and Real Conversations about our Justice System, BLAVITY (Oct. 3, 2015), 
http://blavity.com/vices-new-documentary-fixing-the-system-featuring-president-
obama/ [https://perma.cc/T4WN-9AAN] (describing an interview where defendant 
admitted to selling drugs to raise money to pay criminal justice debt due in 
Pennsylvania). To view the entire documentary, see VICE NEWS, Fixing the 
System: VICE on HBO Special Report (Full Episode), YOUTUBE (Dec. 12, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QgJPYJ0Jn04 [https://perma.cc/F5YN-AXFT]. 
A survey in Alabama found that 17 percent of defendants admitted to committing 
crimes to repay criminal justice debt. FOSTER COOK, JEFFERSON CTY.’S CMTY. 
CORR. PROGRAM TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES FOR SAFER CMTYS., THE BURDEN OF 




 246. HARRIS, supra note 57, at 3; Natapoff, supra note 39, at 1060, 1081. 
 247. HARRIS, supra note 57, at 3; Natapoff, supra note 39, at 1059, 1093. 
 248. ALEX BENDER ET AL., supra note 95, at 4 (describing how California has 
over four million people, representing 17 percent of adults, with suspended 
driver’s licenses); DILLER, supra note 143, at 20–21. (describing suspension of 
driver’s licenses in Florida); Eisen & Eaglin, supra note 150. 
 249. ALEX BENDER ET. AL., supra note 95, at 7. 
 250. CRAIG ADAIR, TEX. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COALITION, THE DRIVER 
RESPONSIBILITY PROGRAM: A TEXAS-SIZED FAILURE 1–3 (2013), www.texascjc.org/ 
system/files/publications/Driver%20Responsibility%20Program.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LQ3H-9AEL]. 
 251. Id. at 1. 
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left 1.3 million drivers with invalid licenses affecting their 
ability to acquire insurance and “likely increas[ing] the number 
of uninsured motorists on Texas roads.”252 Moreover, the 
program collected less than 50 percent of the anticipated 
revenue.253 Even the program’s author has now called for its 
modification or repeal.254 
The impact of criminal justice debt falls not only on 
defendants but also on their families and dependents. Often, 
families face difficult choices between paying for criminal 
justice debt and basic necessities.255 One study found that 
“[w]hile 63% of respondents reported that family members 
were primarily responsible for covering conviction-related 
costs, nearly half also reported that their families could not 
afford to pay these fees and fines.”256 Families that pay the 
criminal justice debt of incarcerated family members suffer “a 
double penalty,” as they no longer have the income of the 
inmates and have to pay the fees related to incarceration.257 
Additionally, failure to timely pay criminal justice debt can be 
classified as failure to comply with a probation or parole order 
resulting in loss of federal benefits, including “food stamps, 
housing assistance, and Supplemental Security Income for 
seniors and people with disabilities.”258 
While decriminalization efforts to change misdemeanors 
into fine-only or non-jailable offenses allow individuals who can 
afford the fines or fees to attend incarceration-alternative 
treatment programs the ability to escape the system, it often 
leaves indigent defendants trapped in the system.259 
Unfortunately, these fine-only misdemeanors have many of the 
same collateral consequences associated with jailable offenses, 
including the impact on employment and housing.260 Moreover, 
decriminalization efforts often result in fewer procedural 
safeguards than jailable offenses. For example, fine-only or 
 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. DEVUONO-POWELL ET AL., supra note 74, at 30. 
 256. Id. at 13. 
 257. Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Prisons Shouldn’t Create Debtors: Column, USA 
TODAY (June 5, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/06/05/johnnie-
melton-incarceration-fees-column/28407981 [https://perma.cc/9YQ6-V6YS]. 
 258. DEVUONO-POWELL ET AL., supra note 74, at 25. 
 259. Natapoff, supra note 39, at 1097. 
 260. Id. at 1091–93. 
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non-jailable misdemeanors eliminate the constitutional 
requirement to provide counsel for defendants.261 Indigent 
defendants without the benefit of a lawyer may receive fines 
that they do not have the ability to pay, and failure to pay may, 
in turn, lead to incarceration.262 
5. Discriminatory Impact on Minorities 
The criminal justice debt problem is especially severe for 
minorities, given the relative lack of wealth and savings 
available to many minorities.263 For example, a 2013 report 
found that the median net worth of white households 
($141,900) was nearly thirteen times the median number for 
black households ($11,000) and more than ten times the 
median number for Hispanic households ($13,700).264 
Additionally, nearly 25 percent of black households have less 
than $5 in savings.265 As a result, minorities are especially 
vulnerable to debt issues. The inability to pay consumer debts 
such as electricity bills or car loans can result in higher 
interest rates and penalties as well as disconnection of utilities 
or repossession of cars.266 The inability to pay criminal justice 
debt can lead to suspension of a driver’s license, arrest, and 
incarceration.267 
Monetary sanctions not only have a regressive effect on the 
 
 261. Id. at 1058–59. 
 262. Id. at 1059, 1081. 
 263. Paul Kiel, Debt and the Racial Wealth Gap, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/03/opinion/debt-and-the-racial-wealth-
gap.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/D7XK-BF4S]. 
 264. Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along 
Racial, Ethnic Lines Since End Of Great Recession, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 
12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-
great-recession/ [https://perma.cc/GKK6-KMAE]. 
 265. Kiel, supra note 263. A discussion of the differences in savings rates 
between racial groups is beyond the scope of this Article. For more information 
about savings rates, see PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE ROLE OF EMERGENCY 
SAVINGS IN FAMILY FINANCIAL SECURITY: WHAT RESOURCES DO FAMILIES HAVE 
FOR FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES (Nov. 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/ 
media/assets/2015/11/emergency-savings-report-2_artfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
Q8TT-CGFG]. 
 266. Kiel, supra note 263. 
 267. Id. Similarly, data reflects that debt collection lawsuits are more likely in 
African-American neighborhoods than white neighborhoods. Paul Kiel & Annie 
Waldman, The Color of Debt: How Collection Suits Squeeze Black Neighborhoods, 
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/debt-collection-
lawsuits-squeeze-black-neighborhoods [https://perma.cc/R26V-ZJ4K]. 
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poor, but their imposition often reflects discrimination against 
minorities. Discretion afforded to law enforcement officers and 
judicial authorities provides opportunities for 
discrimination.268 Even controlling for income levels, evidence 
exists that racial discrimination occurs in the detention, arrest, 
and incarceration of minorities. As such, minorities face 
discrimination when criminal justice debt arising from arrest 
and incarceration is imposed.269 
Racial discrimination is a concern in the imposition of bail 
as reports indicate that African-Americans “and Latinos 
generally suffer worse bail outcomes due to the broad 
discretion and implicit bias in bail decisions.”270 For example, a 
study found that judges in two Texas counties set higher bail 
levels for African-Americans than whites, “even when 
controlling for offense type and defendant characteristics.”271 
The study “suggest[s] that judges value freedom significantly 
less for blacks than whites in Harris county, and . . . [in] Dallas 
county.”272 Similarly, a report from Nebraska found that the 
average bond amount for “Black[s], Hispanic[s], or Native 
American[s] . . . [was] $14,572 more than the average bond for 
a nonviolent offense and $13,109 more for a violent offense.”273 
Similarly, racial disparities are well-documented for traffic 
stops, arrests, and incarceration. “Nationally, African-
Americans comprise 13 percent of the population but 28 
percent of those arrested and 40 percent of those 
incarcerated.”274 Moreover, “African-American men are now 
 
 268. FPD REP., supra note 41, at 63. For a more detailed discussion of the 
discriminatory use of discretionary offenses in Baltimore and Ferguson, see infra 
notes 298–300 and accompanying text. 
 269. FPD REP., supra note 41, at 69. 
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THE BLOG (Nov. 11, 2015, 3:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cynthia-
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[https://perma.cc/PA89-35HJ]. For a more detailed discussion of racial disparities 
in bail decisions, see Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial 
Disparities in Bail Determinations, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEG. & PUB. POL’Y 919 (2013). 
 271. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 7 (citing Shawn D. 
Bushway & Jonah B. Gelbach, Testing for Racial Discrimination in Bail Setting 
Using Nonparametric Estimation of a Parametric Model (Aug. 20, 2011) 
(unpublished paper), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990324 
[https://perma.cc/MVA6-CAKF]). 
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 274. BANNON ET AL., supra note 149, at 4. 
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incarcerated at a rate over six times their white male 
counterparts.”275 African-Americans are “2.7 times more likely 
than whites to be stopped in investigatory stops.”276 
Additionally, African-Americans are also more likely to be 
killed in traffic stops.277 The deaths in 2015 of Walter Scott in 
South Carolina, Samuel Dubose in Ohio, and Sandra Bland in 
Texas all involved minor traffic stops―“a broken brake light, a 
missing front license plate[,] and failure to signal a lane 
change,” respectively.278 
Data from three cities and a dozen state police districts in 
Connecticut also reflected clear racial disparities in traffic 
stops during the day, “when a driver’s race is easier to 
detect.”279 Disturbing data from LaDue, Missouri, indicates 
that while African-Americans account for less than one percent 
of the population, they were 18.5 times more likely to be 
subject to a traffic stop than white drivers.280 Similarly, data 
from Oakland, California, reflect a disproportionate use of 
automatic license plate readers in African-American and 
Latino neighborhoods.281 
The Ferguson report also reflects racial disparities and 
bias. It alleges intentional racial discrimination against 
African-Americans.282 The DOJ found that “African Americans 
are disproportionately represented at nearly every stage of 
Ferguson law enforcement, from initial police contact to final 
disposition of a case in municipal court.”283 The investigation 
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 277. Wesley Lowery, A Disproportionate Number of Black Victims in Fatal 




 278. Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate Risks of 
Driving While Black, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-traffic-stops-driving-black.html [https://perma.cc/ 
5JGK-SXF3]. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Benns & Strode, supra note 125. 
 281. Gillula & Maass, supra note 228. 
 282. FPD REP., supra note 41, at 4. 
 283. Id. at 63. 
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found that even after controlling for “non-race based variables” 
“African Americans remained 2.07 times more likely to be 
searched; 2.00 times more likely to receive a citation; and 2.37 
times more likely to be arrested than other stopped 
individuals.”284 Moreover, the report alleges that each of the 
results were “statistically significant and would occur by 
chance less than one time in 1,000.”285 The chances of the 
differences occurring at the same time were even lower.286 
Additionally, African-Americans were more likely to receive 
multiple citations than whites while stopped.287 
Similarly, the DOJ’s investigation of the Baltimore Police 
Department in 2016 found that the police “[d]epartment 
intrudes disproportionately upon the lives of African 
Americans at every stage of its enforcement activities.”288 The 
report alleges discrimination based on the “overwhelming 
statistical evidence of racial disparities in . . . stops, searches, 
and arrests.”289 For example, the report found that while 
African-Americans represent less than 60 percent of drivers, 
they were involved in over 80 percent of traffic stops.290 
While African-Americans in Baltimore and Ferguson were 
more likely to be searched, police were less likely to find 
contraband with African-American drivers than with white 
drivers.291 Similarly, a study in Greensboro, North Carolina 
revealed that while the police were over two times more likely 
to search African-Americans and their vehicles in traffic stops 
than white drivers, police were more likely to find drugs and 
weapons with white drivers.292 
Similarly, the arrest and incarceration rates related to 
traffic tickets in Port Arthur, Texas, show that while African-
Americans are ticketed at about the same proportional rate as 
their make-up of the population, they represent more than 70 
 
 284. Id. at 65. 
 285. Id. at 66. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE 
BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 47 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/file/883366/download [https://perma.cc/NE6P-MPNF] [hereinafter BPD REP.]. 
 289. Id. at 48. 
 290. Id. at 52. 
 291. Id. at 53; FPD REP., supra note 41, at 65. 
 292. LaFraniere & Lehren, supra note 278. 
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percent of the arrests for such citations.293 Additionally, 
African-Americans in Port Arthur represented approximately 
three-quarters of the individuals who spent more than two 
days in jail for traffic tickets.294 
The discrimination is not limited to traffic violations as 
studies also show discrimination in low-level, non-traffic 
offenses. For example, an examination of data from four cities 
in New Jersey of the low-level offenses of disorderly conduct, 
defiant trespass, loitering, and marijuana possession found 
“extreme racial disparities between black and white arrests.”295 
The study found that African-Americans were “3.2 to 5.7 times 
more likely to be arrested than Whites.”296 Similarly, although 
African-Americans and whites reportedly use marijuana at the 
same rate, in Greensboro, North Carolina, African-Americans 
are five times as likely to be charged with possession of minor 
amounts.297 
Data from Ferguson and Baltimore also reflect racial 
disparity in discretionary charges. African-Americans 
represent about two-thirds of the residents in Ferguson; 
however, they had “95% of Manner of Walking in Roadway 
charges; 94% of all Fail to Comply charges; 92% of all Resisting 
Arrest charges; 92% of all Peace Disturbance charges; and 89% 
of all Failure to Obey charges.”298 These statistics and the 
claim that officer Darren Wilson stopped Michael Brown for 
walking in the street led commentators to claim that “walking 
while black” was a crime in Ferguson.299 
Similarly, in Baltimore, while African-Americans account 
for less than two-thirds of the of the city’s residents, they had 
“87[%] of . . . charges for resisting arrest; 89[%] of . . . charges 
for making a false statement to an officer; 84[%] of . . . charges 
for failing to obey an order; 86[%] of . . . charges for hindering 
 
 293. Campbell & Taggart, supra note 132. 
 294. Id. 
 295. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.J., SELECTIVE POLICING: RACIALLY 
DISPARATE ENFORCEMENT OF LOW-LEVEL OFFENSES IN NEW JERSEY 12 (2015), 
https://www.aclu-nj.org/files/7214/5070/6701/2015_12_21_aclunj_select_enf.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BNJ9-JN2F]. 
 296. Id. 
 297. LaFraniere & Lehren, supra note 278. 
 298. FPD REP., supra note 41, at 62. 
 299. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Walking in Ferguson: If You’re Black, It’s Often 
Against the Law, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2015, 5:58 PM), http://www.latimes.com/ 
nation/la-na-walking-black-ferguson-police-justice-report-20150305-story.html# 
page=1 [https://perma.cc/QXJ6-UKGS]; Hitt, supra note 124. 
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or obstruction . . . 83[%] of . . . arrests for disorderly conduct; 
and 88[%] of . . . arrests for trespassing.”300 
Additionally, the DOJ has alleged that racial disparities in 
Ferguson extend to the judicial system, as African-Americans 
in Ferguson were more likely to have cases that lasted longer, 
have warrants issued, and have disproportionate fines and 
fees.301 
The “racialization of crime” is a growing concern with non-
jailable offenses where procedural and evidentiary safeguards 
are typically not available.302 As a result, the trend toward 
decriminalization of misdemeanors into non-jailable offenses 
“risks further racializing the selection process as police are 
empowered to stop and cite young black men more freely 
without the constraints of criminal adjudication or the threat of 
defense counsel.”303 The “net-widening . . . can further intensify 
racial disparities, creating new safety valves for white, 
wealthy, well-educated, and other favored offender classes to 
exit the enlarged criminal process while poor, minority, 
addicted, and otherwise disadvantaged offenders remain 
behind, unable to extricate themselves.”304 
Corrective action is necessary. The next section of this 
Article will address the abuses in the collection of civil debts 
and the response to curbing those abuses to illustrate a 
potential structure for resolving abuses in the collection of 
criminal justice debt. 
II. THE FEDERAL FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS ABUSES IN
CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION 
Debt collection abuses are not unique to the criminal 
justice arena; America has also witnessed a history of abuses in 
civil debt collection.305 In many ways, consumer debt collection 
 
 300. BPD REP., supra note 288, at 55. 
 301. FPD REP., supra note 41, at 68–69. 
 302. Natapoff, supra note 109, at 1368 (stating that misdemeanors “represent 
the concrete mechanism by which the system is able to generate ‘criminals’ based 
on race, class, and social vulnerability, unconstrained by standard evidentiary 
requirements”). 
 303. Natapoff, supra note 39, at 1059. 
 304. Id. at 1095. 
 305. Michael M. Greenfield, Coercive Collection Tactics—An Analysis of the 
Interests and the Remedies, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 15 (asserting that excessive 
debt collection “tactics have been around for decades, if not centuries”). 
8. 88.4 SOBOL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2017  4:11 PM 
884 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
abuses mirror the abuses arising in the collection of criminal 
justice debt; however, the concerns are even greater in the 
criminal justice context, given the more severe consequences 
arising from arrest, incarceration, and the creation of a 
criminal record.306 
Recognizing that state and local governments had been 
ineffective in stopping abuses by collectors of civil debt, 
Congress created a federal solution.307 The backbone of the 
system is the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) 
enacted in 1977308 and the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) which began operations in July 2011.309 
While Congress has addressed abuses in the collection of 
civil debt, a federal approach to combat abuses in the collection 
and assessment of criminal justice debt does not currently 
exist. This section will identify the reasons for the development 
of the FDCPA and CFPB and illustrate how they parallel the 
need for a similar system to address abuses in the collection of 
criminal justice debt. 
A. The Rationale for the FDCPA Supports Adoption of a 
Federal Act for Criminal Justice Debt 
Just as abuses increased with the explosion of criminal 
justice debt, increases in complaints about collection 
accompanied the exponential growth in consumer debt. The 
 
 306. SHAFROTH & SCHWARTZOL, supra note 3, at 6–7. Acknowledging that 
“[t]he problems of criminal justice debt lie at the intersection of criminal and 
consumer law,” the Criminal Justice Policy Program (CJPP) at Harvard Law 
School and the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) have entered into a 
collaborative project to help address the litigation and policy issues arising from 
criminal justice debt. Id. at 4. More information about the project is available on 
the CJPP and NCLC websites. See http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/publications/ 
confrontingcjdebt [https://perma.cc/M4UK-CNNU]; http://www.nclc.org/issues/ 
confronting-criminal-justice-debt.html [https://perma.cc/HP5B-ZA54]. 
 307. S. REP. NO. 95–382, at 2–3 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 
1696–97 [hereinafter 1977 SENATE REPORT]. 
 308. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2012). While the FDCPA is the primary federal 
statutory source addressing abuses in debt collection, other federal remedies for 
addressing collection abuses exist. See, e.g., The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 
U.S.C § 1681 (2012); The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 
(2012); The Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1991). 
 309. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: 
CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_ 
cfpb_March_FDCPA_Report1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XW8-JPHA] [hereinafter 
CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
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first major growth spurt in consumer debt occurred from 1950 
to 1971. During this period, consumer debt “increased 
fivefold.”310 By 1971, outstanding consumer credit had 
ballooned to more than $130 billion, representing more than 
$600 for every American.311 Similar to how the dramatic 
growth in correctional supervision led to  the proliferation of 
prison, jail, and probation services, the dramatic increase in 
consumer credit resulted in the development of an industry to 
service and collect on consumer accounts.312 In 1976, the 
industry had more than 40,000 collectors in over 5,000 agencies 
that collected more than $5 billion.313 A trade group 
representing about 50 percent of these collectors reported that 
its members contacted eight million people in 1976.314 In the 
1970s, demands for regulation of the debt collectors developed 
at both the state and federal level.315 
On March 20, 1978, the FDCPA became effective and was 
heralded as the “first comprehensive federal debt collection 
statute.”316 In response, many states enacted similar 
legislation.317 The purported goal of the FDCPA—which had 
the support of consumer groups, national debt collection 
organizations, and state and federal law enforcement groups—
was to “protect consumers from a host of unfair, harassing, and 
deceptive debt collection practices without imposing 
unnecessary restrictions on ethical debt collectors.”318 
In support of the FDCPA, Congress provided findings 
indicating abusive practices, inadequacy of laws, availability of 
non-abusive collection methods, the impact on interstate 
 
 310. Robert L. Geltzer & Lois Woocher, Debt Collection Regulation: Its 
Development and Direction for the 1980s, 37 BUS. LAW. 1401, 1402 (1982). 
 311. Greenfield, supra note 305, at 1. 
 312. Geltzer & Woocher, supra note 310, at 1402; David C. Frazier & Edward 
Tonore, Consumer Credit Protection, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 15 U. S. C. 
§ 1692 (Cum. Supp. 1978), 1 MISS. C. L. REV. 157, 157 (1978) (finding “[t]he rise in 
consumer credit outstanding has greatly contributed to the growth of third party 
debt collectors in America”). 
 313. 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 307, at 1696. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Geltzer & Woocher, supra note 310, at 1402. 
 316. Id. The FDCPA was not the first federal regulation addressing debt 
collection. Frazier & Tonore, supra note 312, at 177–80 (discussing FTC’s pre-
FDCPA enforcement actions as well as pre-FDCPA legislation including the 
Truth-in-Lending Act, the Extortionate Credit Transactions Act, and the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act). 
 317. Geltzer & Woocher, supra note 310, at 1402–06. 
 318. 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 307, at 1696. 
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commerce, and the purposes of the Act.319 This section will 
provide detail on the findings and purposes of the FDCPA to 
show how similar and often stronger motivations exist in the 
criminal justice debt context. These concerns support the 
creation of a federal act to confront abuses in the collection of 
criminal justice debt. 
1. Abusive Practices 
“There is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, 
deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt 
collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the 
number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to 
the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.”320 
The abusive practices identified in the Senate report for 
the FDCPA included “obscene or profane language, threats of 
violence, telephone calls at unreasonable hours, 
misrepresentation of a consumer’s legal rights, disclosing a 
consumer’s personal affairs to friends, neighbors, or an 
employer, obtaining information about a consumer through 
false pretense, impersonating public officials and attorneys, 
and simulating legal process.”321 
A former debt collector testifying at the House hearings in 
1976 on the FDCPA provided examples of some of the abuses, 
including seeking recovery of debts that were not owed.322 He 
stated that “beating,” the practice of repeatedly calling 
individuals at home and work, was the typical method of 
collecting debts.323 Other techniques he used to collect included 
pretending to be from a law firm or law enforcement and 
threatening arrest and imprisonment.324 He also threatened to 
have children sent to orphanages if alleged debtors did not 
agree to pay.325 He even called parents of alleged debtors and 
 
 319. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012). 
 320. Id. § 1692(a). 
 321. 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 307, at 1696. 
 322. The Debt Collection Practices Act: Hearings on H.R. 11969 Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the H. Comm. on Banking, Currency & Hous., 
94th Cong. 30 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Hearings] (estimating that at least half of 
the record and book account debts were “illegitimate”). 
 323. Id. at 31. 
 324. Id. at 31–32. 
 325. Id. at 31. 
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told them that their children would be incarcerated unless the 
parents paid their debt.326 For debts in which the limitations 
period had expired, a common practice was to seek token 
payments to restart the limitations period.327 
Other testimony at the House hearings included 
information from reporters who worked undercover at debt 
collection agencies.328 One reporter testified that the manager 
taught collectors to be abusive and harassing.329 Testimony 
further revealed that it did not matter whether the consumer’s 
debt was legitimate, as illustrated by a collector who proudly 
displayed a letter from an alleged debtor stating, “I don’t owe 
this bill, but I am sending you the money just to be rid of 
you.”330 To make matters worse, collectors would also add 
additional charges to amounts owed.331 
Similarly, a former debt collector testified in 1977 about 
the collection abuses he witnessed.332 He stated that the “debt 
collection business . . . not only ruins the lives of people who 
must deal with debt collection agencies, but in many cases it 
can even ruin the lives of those who work as debt collectors.”333 
He confirmed that he, too, was aware of the abuses discussed 
by the former debt collector who testified at the 1976 
hearings.334 He provided details on different techniques or 
“gags” that debt collectors used.335 The gags were intended to 
acquire the debtor’s employment and location information.336 
Typically, they involved pretending to be from sales, insurance, 
or survey companies.337 He testified that collectors would also 
call debtors’ family members, pretending to be from law 
enforcement and reporting that the debtor was allegedly 
 
 326. Id. at 31–32. 
 327. Id. at 30–31. The resurrection of an unenforceable debt creates a zombie-
debt. For a more detailed discussion of this issue and how zombie debts have 
increased due to the growth in debt buyers, see Sobol, Protecting Consumers, 
supra note 4. 
 328. 1976 Hearings, supra note 322, at 45–60. 
 329. Id. at 45. 
 330. Id. at 46. 
 331. Id. 
 332. The Debt Collection Practices Act: Hearings on H.R. 29 Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. & Urban 
Affairs, 95th Cong. 22–27 (1977). 
 333. Id. at 22. 
 334. Id. at 23. 
 335. Id. at 24–26. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. 
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involved in an accident and requesting employment 
information to confirm the debtor’s whereabouts.338 
As described in Part I, the abusive practices associated 
with the collection of criminal justice debt are at least as, if not 
more, severe than the abuses that occur in the collection of 
consumer debt. The concerns about the collateral consequences 
of abusive civil debt collection leading to bankruptcy, family 
disharmony, and unemployment that motivated Congress to 
enact the FDCPA also exist with abusive criminal justice debt 
collection.339 Moreover, the imposition of criminal justice debt 
can result in arrest, incarceration, a criminal justice record, 
loss of federal benefits, and suspension of driver’s licenses.340 
These consequences can cause people to distrust government 
officials. As a result, individuals with criminal justice debt may 
avoid going to public places, seeking medical aid, or requesting 
police assistance.341 
The Senate report refuted the contention that the FDCPA 
would benefit “deadbeats” by describing the “universal 
agreement among scholars, law enforcement officials, and even 
debt collectors that the number of persons who willfully refuse 
to pay debts is miniscule.”342 The report found that the “vast 
majority” of debtors “fully intend to repay their debts,” and 
default is typically the result of “an unforeseen event such as 
unemployment, overextension, serious illness, or marital 
difficulties or divorce.”343 Likewise, many of the abuses that 
arise from criminal justice debt impact individuals because of 
their inability, rather than refusal, to pay.344 
Accordingly, to the extent the abuses and consequences of 
civil debt collection supported the creation of the FDCPA, the 
even more severe abuses and consequences in the collection of 
criminal justice debt support the adoption of a federal act. 
 
 338. Id. at 25. 
 339. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2012). 
 340. See supra Part I.C.4, 5. 
 341. See supra Part I.C.4. 
 342. 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 307, at 1697; John Tavormina, 
Comment, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act – The Consumer’s Answer to 
Abusive Collection Practices, 52 TUL. L. REV. 584, 588 (1977–1978). 
 343. 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 307, at 1697; Tavormina, supra note 
342, at 588. 
 344. See supra Part I.C.3. 
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2. Inadequacy of Laws 
“Existing laws and procedures for redressing these injuries 
are inadequate to protect consumers.”345 
Just as current efforts to curb abuses in the collection of 
criminal justice debt abuse have failed, pre-FDCPA efforts to 
prevent abuses by civil debt collectors had failed at both the 
federal and state level. Before the 1970s, state and federal 
governments provided little or no regulation of debt collection 
activities.346 
The Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968347 marked the 
beginning of federal efforts to regulate consumer credit; 
however, such efforts provided only indirect means of 
regulation.348 The regulation included potential actions by the 
Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Communications 
Commission, and the United States Postal Service that allowed 
for ad hoc administrative decisions but failed to statutorily 
describe the rights of consumers and the duties of collectors.349 
Additionally, the Senate report on the FDCPA emphasized 
that the collection abuses were widespread, national problems 
and the states had failed to provide sufficient laws to curb debt 
abuse.350 The report revealed that about eighty million people, 
or 40 percent of Americans, had “no meaningful protection from 
debt collection abuse,” finding that thirteen states had no debt 
collection laws, and another eleven states had ineffective 
safeguards.351 The report concluded that the states’ failure to 
provide “meaningful legislation” was the “primary reason” for 
“widespread” abusive debt collection.352 
Moreover, common-law remedies were ineffective 
piecemeal approaches to help consumers.353 For example, 
 
 345. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b) (2012). 
 346. Geltzer & Woocher, supra note 310, at 1402. 
 347. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1691. 
 348. Tavormina, supra note 342, at 584. For example, the powers of the 
Federal Trade Commission were based only on guidelines without “the force of 
law” and the Federal Communications Commission’s authority was limited to 
telephone communications. 1976 Hearings, supra note 322, at 23. 
 349. Tavormina, supra note 342, at 584–85. 
 350. 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 307, at 1696–97. 
 351. Id. at 1697. 
 352. Id. at 1696; Frazier & Tonore, supra note 312, at 159. 
 353. Frazier & Tonore, supra note 312, at 180; Tavormina, supra note 342, at 
586. 
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causes of action for libel and slander, invasion of privacy, 
emotional distress, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution 
were not effective against debt collection abuses.354 One 
problem with the common-law approach is its focus on 
compensating for, rather than preventing, abuses.355 
Similarly, the approach to abuses in criminal justice debt 
collection has been a compensatory approach rather than a 
preventive approach. The current approach relies on lawsuits 
filed by the DOJ, the ACLU, and other private non-profit 
groups that seek to establish constitutional violations by 
individual municipalities. This case-by-case method is only a 
piecemeal approach for past abuses and does not provide a 
comprehensive method for preventing abuses that are 
occurring throughout the country.356 
3. Alternative Non-Abusive Collection Methods 
“Means other than misrepresentation or other abusive debt 
collection practices are available for the effective collection 
of debts.”357 
Just as Congress recognized that non-abusive methods 
exist for collection of civil debt, alternative non-offensive 
methods for collecting criminal justice debt exist. The non-
abusive alternatives in the criminal justice context include 
taking into account ability to pay at the time of sentencing as 
well as at the time of collection.358 Eliminating incarceration 
when failure to pay is based on inability to pay can also result 
in savings to municipalities based on the expense of 
incarceration and the unlikelihood of financial recovery from 
those unable to pay.359 Studies have shown that such punitive 
systems can be fiscally counterproductive.360 Additionally, 
 
 354. Frazier & Tonore, supra note 312, at 161–66; Tavormina, supra note 342, 
at 586. 
 355. Frazier & Tonore, supra note 312, at 180. 
 356. See Balko, supra note 35 (claiming that while lawsuits may end debtors’ 
prisons “[b]asic humanity ought to compel . . . [public officials] to address the 
problem way before these lawsuits ever get in front of jury”). 
 357. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c) (2012). 
 358. See, e.g., Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 4, at 524–32 (discussing 
alternative systems, including the use of day fines). 
 359. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
 360. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
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reducing or eliminating poverty penalties can help prevent 
citizens from entering the endless cycle of debt based on the 
piling-on of charges when they lack the ability to pay. Another 
alternative to abusive criminal justice debt charges is the use 
of non-monetary sanctions such as community service. 
Similarly, instead of relying on cash bail systems that unfairly 
discriminate against the indigent and lead to expenses for 
jailing those who are unable to pay bail, alternatives should 
focus on whether there is a public safety or flight risk.361 
4. Interstate Commerce 
“Abusive debt collection practices are carried on to a 
substantial extent in interstate commerce and through 
means and instrumentalities of such commerce. Even where 
abusive debt collection practices are purely intrastate in 
character, they nevertheless directly affect interstate 
commerce.”362 
A justification for the use of federal FDCPA was the 
impact on interstate commerce as the development of wide area 
telephone service lines allowed for a “dramatic increase in 
interstate collections.”363 While such concerns may not at first 
be as apparent in the criminal debt arena, where most of the 
collections are intrastate, the imposition of criminal justice 
debt is not limited to state residents. Instead, it also extends to 
non-residents visiting the state. Additionally, interstate 
commerce may be impacted where out-of-state private 
companies are used. For example, Sentinel Offender Services, a 
private probation company headquartered in California, 
advertises on its website that it is operating “across the United 
States” with “more than 40 field locations.”364 
Moreover, as illustrated by the Ferguson report, the 
abusive collection of criminal justice debt implicates equal 
protection and due process concerns as well as civil rights 
 
 361. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 362. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(d) (2012). 
 363. 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 307, at 1697. 
 364. About Sentinel Offender Services, https://www.sentineladvantage.com/ 
about-sentinel-offender-services/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ 
5ULU-U7JM]. 
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violations and discrimination.365 Additional constitutional 
concerns may arise under the Sixth Amendment’s right to 
counsel and the Eighth Amendment’s restriction on excessive 
bail and fines.366 These federal questions further support the 
adoption of a federal statute.367 
5. Purposes 
“[T]he purpose of this subchapter [is] to eliminate abusive 
debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that 
those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt 
collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, 
and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers 
against debt collection abuses.”368 
Just as the FDCPA seeks to promote consistent action and 
prevent non-abusive collectors from suffering a competitive 
disadvantage, reforms of criminal justice debt collection should 
be established to provide consistent treatment of defendants 
and to not unfairly punish municipalities who comply with the 
reforms. Moreover, municipalities who comply and achieve 
results could receive federal funding.369 
  
 
 365. FPD REP., supra note 41, at 1–6. Bearden involved equal protection and 
due process concerns. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665–67 (1983). 
 366. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VIII. For a more detailed discussion of the 
impact of the Eighth Amendment on criminal justice debt, see Beth A. Colgan, 
Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CAL. L. REV. 277 (2014); Eisen, supra 
note 73. 
 367. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A 
Congressional Solution to the Nation’s Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 487, 508–16 (2010) (advocating the adoption of a federal act to provide 
right to counsel for indigent criminal defendants). 
 368. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012). 
 369. See LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & INIMAI CHETTIAR, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE, THE REVERSE MASS INCARCERATION ACT 7–11 (2015), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/The_Reverse_Mass
_Incarceration_Act%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/XDL9-ZKY8] (advocating federal 
funds for states that reduce imprisonment and crime). 
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B. The Justifications for the CFPB Support the Need for a 
Federal Agency to Combat Abusive Criminal Justice 
Debt Collection 
After the enactment of the FDCPA and until the early 
1990s, debt collection complaints declined.370 Thereafter, 
abuses and complaints grew as both consumer debt and debt 
collection again expanded at exponential rates until 2010.371 
By 2010, the Federal Trade Commission classified the system 
of addressing consumer debt disputes as “broken.”372 Beginning 
operations in July 2011, the CFPB would become the new “cop 
on the beat” to help combat abuses in debt collection.373 
The reasons why the CFPB was necessary to aid in the 
battle against abusive civil debt collection parallel similar 
concerns that exist regarding why a federal agency should be 
involved with criminal justice debt issues. 
Although President Carter had recognized the need for a 
consumer protection agency to regulate debt collection issues 
when he signed the FDCPA,374 it would take more than thirty 
years before the CFPB was created.375 The CFPB was one part 
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 enacted in response to the economic 
recession of 2008.376 A primary concern of the CFPB was to 
 
 370. Lynn A.S. Araki, Comment, RX for Abusive Debt Collection Practices: 
Amend the FDCPA, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 69, 77–78 (1995). 
 371. Sobol, Protecting Consumers, supra note 4, at 333–36. 
 372. FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING 
CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION i (2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/07/debtcollectionreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q27U-
H3F3]. 
 373.  Richard Cordray, Prepared Remarks of CFPB Director Richard Cordray 
at University of Michigan Law School (Oct. 24, 2014), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director-
richard-cordray-at-university-of-michigan-law-school/ [http://perma.cc/K4K9-
EHLN]; see also Dee Pridgen, Sea Changes in Consumer Financial Protection: 
Stronger Agency & Stronger Laws, 13 WYO. L. REV. 405, 405–06 (2013) 
(categorizing the creation of the CFPB as a “sea change” in consumer protection 
law). For an empirical analysis of the effectiveness of CFPB’s enforcement actions 
through 2015, see Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1057 (2016). 
 374. Presidential Statement on Signing the Consumer Protection Act 
Amendments 1977, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1628 (Sept. 20, 1977). 
 375. CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 309, at 2. 
 376. A detailed discussion of Dodd-Frank Act and the creation of the CFPB is 
beyond the scope of this Article. For more detailed information, see Leonard J. 
Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy & Ethan Bernstein, The Consumer Financial 
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address issues created by the mortgage crisis.377 However, the 
CFPB was not limited to only mortgage debt or mortgage-
granting entities. It also was given authority to address 
general debt collection abuses, including the extension of credit 
to a borrower without adequate regard to a borrower’s 
reasonable ability to repay.378 Moreover, while the FTC was 
limited to review of unfair and deceptive practices by non-bank 
entities, the CFPB was granted additional authority to review 
abusive practices and non-financial institutions.379 
The CFPB was needed as the debt-collection industry had 
radically changed from the industry that existed when 
Congress passed the FDCPA.380 The primary changes in the 
industry were the addition of debt-buyers and the use of new 
technologies.381 
Between 1980 and 2010, consumer credit once again grew 
at record rates with revolving debt (primarily credit card debt) 
 
Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1142–49 (2012). 
 377. Susan Block-Lieb, Accountability and the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 25, 27 (2012). 
 378. Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd Frank and Consumer Financial 
Protection Act’s “Abusive” Standard, 14 J. CONS. & COM. L. 118, 122 (2011). 
 379. Jean Braucher, Form & Substance in Consumer Financial Protection, 7 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 107, 117–18 (2012). 
 380. CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 309, at 9 (stating “[t]oday’s 
collection industry is markedly different from the industry contemplated when 
Congress enacted the FDCPA”). The CFPB has also been subject to criticism. See, 
e.g., Michael Hiltzik, Consumer Protection: Why Do Republicans Hate the CFPB so 
Much?, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 2015, 12:46 PM), http://www.latimes.com/ 
business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-cfpb-republicans-20150723-column.html [http://perma.cc/ 
G4FB-6NY3]; Ian Salisbury, The CFPB Turns 5 Today. Here’s What It’s Done (and 
What It Hasn’t), TIME (July 21, 2016), http://time.com/money/4412754/cfpb-5-year-
anniversary-accomplishments/ [https://perma.cc/25ML-25TR].  Lawsuits have 
focused on, among other things, the role of the director who can only be removed 
for cause. See, e.g., PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 37–39 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (declaring that the “CFPB is unconstitutionally structured 
because it is an independent agency headed by a single Director,” but remedying 
the constitutional violation by “severing the for-cause removal position” and 
allowing the CFPB to “operate as an executive agency”). While Richard Cordray 
was the acting director when this Article was submitted for publication, concerns 
exist about the future of the CFPB under a Trump administration. Lisa Lambert, 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Could Be Defanged Under Donald Trump, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2016, 1:41 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
entry/cfpb-donald-trump_us_58256519e4b02d21bbc839ea [http://perma.cc/3PBZ-
L9Z4]. Even if there are changes in CFPB’s leadership or in its regulatory role, 
the conclusions of this Article still support the use of the DOJ and a federal act to 
address criminal justice debt abuses. 
 381. CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 309, at 9. 
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reaching a peak in 2008 at over $1 trillion.382 While consumer 
credit was escalating, the debt collection industry experienced 
a marked change as creditors began selling their debts. By 
2005, the debt-buying industry was a $100 billion industry.383 
The FTC characterized the massive influx of debt buyers as the 
“most significant change in the debt collection business” since 
2000.384 Buyers paid cents on the dollar for debts and received 
little information or documentation regarding the debts. 
Moreover, the information received was often unwarranted, 
contained inaccurate or incomplete information, and the debts 
sold included debts that had been sold, paid, settled, or were 
stale.385 Additionally, new technologies “fundamentally 
altered” the collection industry.386 Innovations were especially 
apparent in electronic payment systems and new 
communication methods, including automatic dialers, e-mails, 
cell phones, and text messaging.387 
An agency with the flexibility to provide regulations to 
address these new types of collectors and these new 
technologies was necessary. While the FDCPA had established 
statutory restrictions and requirements for debt collectors, the 
FDCPA had also explicitly precluded the development of 
regulations.388 Additionally, before the CFPB, a central agency 
 
 382. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., HISTORICAL DATA FOR 
CONSUMER CREDIT OUTSTANDING (LEVELS), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
releases/g19/HIST/cc_hist_sa_levels.html (last updated Feb. 7, 2017) 
[http://perma.cc/KCX4-AEMB]; Sobol, Protecting Consumers, supra note 4, at 333–
34. 
 383. Peter A. Holland, The One Hundred Billion Dollar Problem in Small 
Claims Court: Robo-Signing and Lack of Proof in Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 259, 265 (2011). 
 384. FED. TRADE COMM’N, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS: THE CHALLENGES 
OF CHANGE, A WORKSHOP REPORT iv (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/collecting-consumer-debts-challenges-change-federal-trade-
commission-workshop-report/dcwr.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZVN9-HR6Z] [hereinafter 
FTC Workshop]. 
 385. Sobol, Protecting Consumers, supra note 4, at 352–59. See Dalié Jiménez, 
Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41 (2015) (providing an 
analysis of the life-cycle of a sold debt by examining over eighty debt purchase 
and sale agreements). 
 386. FTC Workshop, supra note 384, at iv. 
 387. Id. at 35–51; William P. Hoffman, Comment, Recapturing the 
Congressional Intent Behind the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 29 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 549, 562–68 (2010). 
 388. FTC Workshop, supra note 384, at 69–70. Prior to the adoption of Dodd-
Frank Act, the FDCPA explicitly prohibited the FTC from issuing regulations 
concerning debt collection. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(d) (1995). Although the FTC was 
8. 88.4 SOBOL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2017  4:11 PM 
896 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
to address abuses and coordinate responses was not available, 
often leading to conflicting results.389 The Dodd-Frank Act 
addressed these concerns by giving the CFPB primary 
responsibility for administering the FDCPA and exclusive 
jurisdiction to create regulations for consumer financial 
protection.390 
Just as civil debt collection has witnessed an expansion in 
new actors (debt buyers) and new technologies (payment and 
communication systems), criminal justice debt collection has 
seen new types of collectors and technologies. The new 
collectors of criminal justice debt arise from outsourcing to 
private prisons, probation companies, and collection services.391 
New technologies include license plate readers and credit/debit 
card readers in police cars that allow for new methods of 
collecting criminal justice debt.392 The justifications for a 
federal agency with rulemaking and enforcement authority to 
address and coordinate actions against the ever-changing 
landscape of civil debt collection exist to address the evolving 
issues in the collection of criminal justice debt. 
III.  APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT 
COLLECTION 
Just as the FDCPA and CFPB provide a framework to 
confront abuses in the collection of consumer debts, a federal 
act and regulatory authority should apply to criminal justice 
debt. The remedies under the FDCPA and CFPB fall into three 
general categories: prohibited practices, required actions, and 
 
limited in its ability to create regulations under the FDCPA, the FTC did have 
authority to address unfair or deceptive acts by non-bank entities under the 
provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). A detailed 
discussion of the role of the FTC is beyond the scope of this Article. For more 
information, see THE REGULATORY REVOLUTION AT THE FTC: A THIRTY-YEAR 
PERSPECTIVE ON COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION (James Campbell 
Cooper ed. 2013). 
 389. Pridgen, supra note 373, at 405–09. 
 390. CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 309, at 6; Matthew R. Bremner, 
Note, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: The Need for Reform in the Age of 
Financial Chaos, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1553, 1593 (2011); Block-Lieb, supra note 
377, at 29; 12 U.S.C. § 5512 (2012). 
 391. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 106 (discussing how private probation 
companies create new issues as they assess additional charges to people who are 
unable to pay fines and fees). 
 392. See supra notes 132–138 and accompanying text. 
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enforcement and outreach activities. This section identifies the 
key remedies in these categories and outlines how similar 
provisions should be adopted to combat abusive criminal justice 
debt practices. In doing so, I advocate the adoption of the 
federal Fair Justice Debt Practices Act (FJDPA) to serve as the 
statutory basis similar to the FDCPA and propose that the 
DOJ serve as the regulatory authority for the FJDPA, just as 
the CFPB plays that role for the FDCPA. Recognizing the need 
for further collection of data, study, and debate about the 
methods for addressing abuses in the collection of criminal 
justice debt, this Article sets forth the concepts and a 
framework for the FJDPA but leaves the formulation of the 
specific provisions to a subsequent article. 
Moreover, acknowledging that the significant differences 
between criminal and consumer debts create a need for 
differences in specific remedies, this Article does not propose 
that the FDCPA and CFPB simply be extended to criminal 
justice debt, but instead that the statutory and regulatory 
framework used for consumer protection be applied to protect 
the victims of abusive criminal justice debt practices. 
The primary differences between civil and criminal debts 
are the parties involved and the manner in which the debts are 
incurred. For consumer debt issues, amounts are frequently 
owed to private parties and private collection agents are 
involved, whereas for criminal debt matters, the amounts are 
generally owed to public parties and public collection agents 
are involved.393 Nonetheless, public parties are often holders of 
the two largest sources of consumer debt: mortgage debt and 
student loan debt.394 Furthermore, due to outsourcing, private 
parties are also involved in the collection of criminal justice 
debt.395 
Additionally, consumer debts are incurred on a voluntary 
basis in exchange for services, whereas criminal justice 
 
 393. The FDCPA does not apply to government officials. 15 U.S.C. § 
1692a(6)(C) (2012); 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 307, at 1698 (describing that 
debt collector under the FDCPA does not apply to “[g]overnment officials, such as 
marshals and sheriffs, while in the conduct of their official duties”). 
 394. See, e.g., Courtney Miller, How Uncle Sam Became the Biggest Student 
Lender, NERDWALLET (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/ 
studies/uncle-sam-biggest-student-lender/ [http://perma.cc/EXN7-VFC4] (stating 
that the federal government is the “largest holder of nonrevolving American 
consumer debt,” owning more than 70 percent of student loan debt). 
 395. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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obligations are imposed.396 As such, criminal fines and fees are 
generally not considered debts under the FDCPA.397 
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit has ruled that unpaid 
parking fees and nonpayment sanctions were debts for 
purposes of the FDCPA.398 The district court ruled that the fee 
was “properly characterized as a fine” rather than as a debt 
subject to the FDCPA.399 The fee consisted of a daily parking 
charge of $1.50 and a non-payment sanction of $45.00.400 A 
public railroad owned the parking lot but used private entities 
to manage the lot and collect on outstanding amounts.401 The 
FTC and CFPB filed an amicus brief asserting that the charges 
were within the FDCPA’s broad definition of a debt.402 The 
Seventh Circuit agreed. The court found the parties had 
entered into a contractual obligation when the plaintiffs, by 
parking, accepted the offer contained in the signs on the lot.403 
These differences are important and help explain why the 
specific remedies for consumer and criminal justice debts will 
vary. However, the framework established by the FDCPA and 
CFPB can be a model for confronting abusive criminal justice 
debt practices. 
A. Prohibited Practices 
The FDCPA prohibits general categories of behavior by 
debt collectors and establishes specific restrictions on collector 
activities. Similarly, the FJDPA should contain general and 
specific restrictions for the collection of criminal justice debt. 
 
 396. See Bell v. Providence Cmty. Corr., No. 3:11–00203, 2011 WL 2218600, at 
*4–5 (M.D. Tenn. June 7, 2011) (holding that probation fees were not a debt under 
the FDCPA as they did not arise from a consumer transaction, “business deal or 
consensual understanding”). 
 397. Id.; see also Pierre v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., No. 15-
2596, 2017 WL 1102635 at *10  (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2017) (holding that neither tolls 
nor related penalties for non-payment were debts under the FDCPA). 
 398. Franklin v. Parking Revenue Recovery Servs., Inc, 832 F.3d 741, 743 (7th 
Cir. 2016). 
 399. Franklin v. Parking Revenue Recovery Servs., Inc, No. 13 C 02578, 2014 
WL 6685472, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2014). 
 400. Id. at *2. 
 401. Id. at *1. 
 402. Brief of Amici Curiae Fed. Trade Comm’n & Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 
at 16–17, Franklin v. Parking Revenue Recovery Servs., Inc, No. 14-3774 (7th Cir. 
Dec. 11, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201512_cfpb_amicus-brief-
franklin.pdf [https://perma.cc/P29A-KLVX]. 
 403. Franklin, 832 F.3d at 745. 
8. 88.4 SOBOL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2017  4:11 PM 
2017] FIGHTING FINES & FEES 899 
A primary objective of the FDCPA is to prevent 
harassment or abuse.404 Violations of the prohibition on 
harassment or abuse under the FDCPA include using or 
threatening violence to harm a person, her reputation, or her 
property.405 Additionally, the FDCPA prohibits abusive, 
profane, or obscene language as well as calling individuals 
“repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or 
harass.”406 
Similarly, the FJDPA should contain provisions to restrict 
discriminatory, abusive, and harassing actions by the actors 
involved in the collection of criminal justice debt. The FJDPA 
should prohibit using or threatening incarceration to collect 
criminal justice debt unless a judge determines that a 
defendant has the ability to pay the debt. Officers should be 
held accountable for discriminatory actions in stopping, 
detaining, searching, and arresting individuals.407 Similarly, 
courts should avoid the discriminatory application of bail and 
sentencing. Probation and collection officers, whether public or 
private officials, should be prohibited from using abusive 
techniques to collect revenue. 
The FDCPA also prohibits false or misleading 
representations.408 The general provisions prohibit false 
statements regarding the “character, amount, or legal status of 
any debt.”409 This prohibition covers collectors falsely asserting 
that they have a judgment on a debt.410 Moreover, the FDCPA 
prohibits misrepresentations as to the consequences of failure 
to pay a debt as well as the actions that collectors are 
authorized to take.411 In general, the FDCPA prohibits 
collectors from threatening “any action that cannot legally be 
taken or that is not intended to be taken.”412 For example, 
collectors are not permitted to represent or imply that failure 
to pay will result in “arrest or imprisonment . . . or the seizure, 
 
 404. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (2012). 
 405. Id. § 1692d(1). 
 406. Id. § 1692d(2), (5). 
 407. See e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.J., supra note 295, at 6. 
 408. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012). 
 409. Id. § 1692e(2). 
 410. David B. Goldston, Federal Regulation of Debt Collection Practices—The 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Section Five of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 13 U.S.F. L. REV. 575, 589 (1979). 
 411. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(4), (5). 
 412. Id. § 1692e(5). 
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garnishment, attachment, or sale of any property or wages . . . 
unless such action is lawful and the debt collector or creditor 
intends to take such action.”413 
Similarly, the FJDPA should contain provisions 
prohibiting false or misleading representations in the collection 
of criminal justice debt. For example, the FJDPA should 
prohibit collectors of criminal justice debt from misrepresenting 
the consequences of failure to pay the debt. Collectors should 
not be permitted to threaten incarceration without affording 
defendants the right to a meaningful ability to pay hearing and 
court-appointed counsel, if indigent. Similarly, probation 
officers should not be permitted to require conditions, tests, 
classes, or fees that are not court-mandated. 
Additionally, the FDCPA confronts unfair practices by 
stating that a “debt collector may not use unfair or 
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect a debt.”414 
Unfair conduct under the statute includes seeking to collect 
amounts, including interest or fees, not authorized by the 
underlying debt agreement or permitted by law.415 
Similarly, the FJDPA should address unfair or 
unconscionable methods of collecting criminal justice debt. For 
example, the FJDPA should restrict or eliminate the use of 
poverty penalties that arise solely because an individual lacks 
the ability to pay a monetary charge. Moreover, the FJDPA 
should include provisions restricting the use of cash bail and 
private probation companies. 
Similar provisions have been proposed at the federal level. 
For example, California Representative Ted Lieu has 
introduced the “No Money Bail Act of 2016,” which bans cash 
bail for federal crimes and restricts funding to states that use 
cash bail.416 Additionally, the proposed “End of Debtor’s Prison 
Act” prohibits certain federal grants to states and 
municipalities that rely on private probation companies that 
charge for “pay-only” probation.417 Some cities have already 
 
 413. Id. § 1692e(4). 
 414. Id. § 1692f. 
 415. Id. § 1692f(1). 
 416. No Money Bail Act of 2016, H.R. 4611, 114th Cong. (2016); Press Release, 
Ted W. Lieu, Congressman Ted W. Lieu Introduces the “No Money Bail Act of 
2016” (Feb. 24, 2016), https://lieu.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/ 
congressman-ted-w-lieu-introduces-no-money-bail-act-2016-0 [http://perma.cc/ 
PY8E-V3EU]. 
 417. End of Debtor’s Prison Act of 2017, H.R. 1724, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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banned private probation companies.418 The initial reports 
from municipalities that have stopped using private probation 
companies are favorable.419 
The FJDPA could expressly prohibit incarceration based 
on fines or fees.420 Professor Natapoff has suggested statutory 
language aimed at preventing the incarceration of individuals 
who are unable to pay criminal justice debt created by 
decriminalization laws.421 If the FJDPA does not ban 
incarceration as a prohibited practice, then it should establish 
required practices, as described in the following section, to 
determine when incarceration for failure to pay criminal justice 
debt is appropriate. 
The FDCPA also establishes specific restrictions on 
communications with the debtor and third parties.422 For 
example, it creates time and place restrictions on contacting 
the debtor, prohibiting communications at inconvenient times 
(presumed to be after nine p.m. and before eight a.m.) and at 
the debtor’s place of employment.423 Furthermore, the FDCPA 
seeks to prevent debt collectors from revealing information to 
third parties about the status of an individual as a debtor by 
generally restricting calls to third parties to requests for 
 
 418. John Archibald, Alabama’s For-Profit Courts Turn American Dream into 
Nightmare, AL.COM (Nov. 21, 2014, 1:42 PM), http://www.al.com/ 
opinion/index.ssf/2014/11/alabamas_for-profit_courts_tur.html [http://perma.cc/ 
MZ2X-2JST]. See, e.g., Agreement to Settle Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 
Claims ¶ 8, Mitchell v. City of Montgomery, No. 2:14-cv-00186-MHT-CSC (M.D. 
Ala. Nov. 17, 2014), http://media.al.com/opinion/other/montgomeryDoc%2051-
1%20-%20Settlement%20of%20Injunctive%20and%20Declaratory%20Claims% 
2011-17-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/JH23-SBM7] (providing a three-year ban on use 
of private probation companies in Montgomery, Alabama). 
 419. See, e.g., Patrick McCreless, Smooth Transition Since Cities Took Over 
Municipal Court Probation Services, ANNISTON STAR (Feb. 20, 2016), 
http://www.annistonstar.com/news/anniston/smooth-transition-since-cities-took-
over-municipal-court-probation-services/article_2d461526-d823-11e5-af0e-8bc64a 
886b0e.html [http://perma.cc/ANY6-3B8E] (describing the results in Anniston and 
Jacksonville, Alabama after ceasing the use of private probation companies). 
 420. Some commentators would expressly ban incarceration for fees or fines. 
See, e.g., Beckett & Harris, supra note 36, at 519. Others argue that the ban 
should be restricted to fees. See, e.g., R. Barry Ruback, The Benefits and Costs of 
Economic Sanctions: Considering the Victim, the Offender, and Society, 99 MINN. 
L. REV. 1779, 1820 (2015). 
 421. Natapoff, supra note 39, at 1112–13. 
 422. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c (2012). 
 423. Id. § 1692c(a)(1), (3). The restriction on contacting a debtor at his job 
exists when “the debt collector knows or has reason to know that the consumer’s 
employer prohibits the consumer from receiving such communication.” 15 U.S.C. § 
1692c(a)(3). 
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location information.424 Additionally, the FDCPA prohibits 
communications by postcard or use of language or symbols on 
envelopes that indicate that the communications are for debt 
collection.425 
Similarly, given the collateral consequences that can arise 
when third parties are aware of criminal justice debt—
including the impact on employment and housing—the FJDPA 
should also prohibit communications at an individual’s place of 
employment and restrict communications with third parties. 
B. Required Practices 
In addition to prohibiting certain types of behavior, the 
FDCPA also sets forth required practices for debt collectors. 
Similarly, the FJDPA should establish requirements and 
standards for the actors involved in the collection of criminal 
justice debt. 
The FDCPA sets up a system for validating and verifying 
debts.426 Although the process has been subject to criticism and 
should be amended to reflect the growth in debt buyers,427 the 
concept of providing notice of rights is an important notion that 
should apply to the collection of criminal justice debt. The basic 
idea of the validation and verification requirements is to 
provide notice and information to consumers to prevent the 
collection from the wrong people or for the wrong amount.428 
The FDCPA requires that, within five days of her initial 
communication, a collector provide the consumer with written 
notice which includes the amount of the debt and the name of 
the creditor as well as statements about the debtor’s ability to 
dispute the debt.429 The collector must notify the debtor that 
 
 424. Id. § 1692b, 1692c(b). 
 425. Id. § 1692b(4), (5). 
 426. Id. § 1692g. 
 427. See Sobol, Protecting Consumers, supra note 4, at 364–66. For an 
empirical examination of whether consumers understand validation notices, see 
Jeff Sovern & Kate K. Walton, Are Validation Notices Valid? An Empirical 
Evaluation of Consumer Understanding of Debt Collection Validation Notices, 
SMU L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
 428. As stated in the Senate Report, the purpose of the validation provision 
was to “eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong 
person or attempting to collect debts which the consumer has already paid.” 1977 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 307, at 1699. 
 429. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 
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she has thirty days to dispute the debt.430 Additionally, the 
collector must inform the debtor that if she requests 
information about the original creditor within the thirty days, 
the collector will provide the name and address of the original 
creditor.431 If the debtor timely disputes the debt or requests 
information about the original creditor, the collector must cease 
collection actions and communications until verification or the 
original creditor information is provided.432 
Interestingly, the validation notices provided under the 
FDCPA are often referred to as “mini-Miranda” warnings.433 
Similarly, disclosure requirements should be set up for the 
collection of criminal justice debt. The FJDPA should require 
that defendants be afforded ability to pay hearings and 
defendants be provided with information about the process for 
contesting criminal justice debt and asserting inability to pay. 
For example, the FJDPA could provide that notice of rights be 
described on citations, at the courthouse, and on the court’s 
website. Moreover, the FJDPA could provide counsel for 
indigent defendants at such hearings.434 
The FJDPA should also establish procedures and 
guidelines for determining the dollar amounts for bail, fines, 
and fees. A process should be set up for review of existing 
monetary charges as well as for the creation of new charges. 
Those guidelines should leave open the possibility of 
eliminating charges and denying new charges that may not be 
appropriate.435 For example, elimination of cash bail or fees for 
public defenders could be considered. 
To address the abusive use of fines and fees to generate 
revenue for municipalities, the FJDPA should also require 
 
 430. Id. 
 431. Id. § 1692g(a)(5). 
 432. Id. § 1692g(b). 
 433. Araki, supra note 370, at 95–97; Melissa Travis, Comment, The Three Cs 
Versus the Dinosaur: Updating the Technologically Archaic FDCPA to Provide 
Consumers, Collectors, and Courts Clarity, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1033, 1039–40 
(2011). 
 434. State Representative Adrienne Wooten has introduced a bill in 
Mississippi to address the rights of indigent defendants in the collection of fines 
and fees. The proposal requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants 
facing incarceration for failure to pay fines and fees and establishes scenarios 
where defendants are presumed unable to pay fines and fees. H.B. 672, 132d Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2017). 
 435. For a more detailed discussion analyzing whether monetary charges 
should be eliminated, see Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 4, at 532–34. 
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revenue caps. Such caps should be inclusive to avoid the issue 
of cities increasing fines and fees on areas not covered.436 A 
larger fine does not necessarily mean greater compliance. For 
example, data reflects that traffic fines need not be high to help 
traffic safety, as “[g]etting the ticket correlates to driver safety, 
not the amount it costs.”437 
Requiring use of cameras may also help discourage 
offensive and discriminatory collection efforts.438 For example, 
California now requires that officers record all traffic and 
pedestrian stops.439 Additionally, a police chief relied on 
dashboard recordings to dismiss officers accused of 
discriminating against African-American drivers.440 
The FDCPA also has a provision regarding the application 
of payments when a debtor has multiple debts. Under such 
circumstances, collectors must apply payment based on the 
debtor’s request rather than to a disputed debt.441 Similarly, 
the FJDPA should establish a system for prioritization of the 
application of payments received. For example, payments 
should be applied to fines and restitution before fees. 
C. Enforcement and Outreach Activities 
Merely establishing a federal law will not be effective 
unless parties are aware of their rights and obligations, and its 
provisions are enforced. The primary functions of the CFPB 
include rulemaking, supervision, enforcement, responding to 
consumer complaints, and education.442 
Just as the CFPB has become the “cop on the beat” to help 
with the coordination of enforcement of the FDCPA, the DOJ 
should help enforce the FJDPA. The DOJ is already performing 
many activities similar to the activities undertaken by the 
CFPB. What allows the CFPB to succeed is the ability to rely 
 
 436. For example, when Missouri placed caps on traffic fines, a dramatic 
increase in non-traffic fines occurred. See supra notes 128–131 and accompanying 
text. 
 437. Campbell & Taggart, supra note 132 (relying on a Canadian study on 
traffic fines). 
 438. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.J., supra note 295, at 6 (recommending 
use of “dashboard and/or body cameras”). 
 439. LaFraniere & Lehren, supra note 278. 
 440. Id. 
 441. 15 U.S.C. § 1692h (2012). 
 442. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(c) (2012); Kennedy et al., supra note 376, at 1146. 
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on the FDCPA, whereas the DOJ in its enforcement actions 
often has to rely on more general safeguards and greater 
burdens in establishing violations of constitutional and civil 
rights. Adopting a federal act setting forth the prohibited and 
required practices of actors involved in the collection of 
criminal justice debt will allow the DOJ to more effectively 
combat abusive practices. Moreover, the DOJ should create or 
designate a division to address compliance and help with 
education and outreach. 
The CFPB’s rulemaking authority allows it to establish 
guidelines to help collectors understand their requirements 
under the FDCPA. Similarly, the DOJ should develop 
guidelines to help courts understand their obligations under 
the FJDPA. For example, the DOJ could create procedures and 
directives for ability to pay hearings, including notice process, 
right to counsel, standards for indigency, and alternatives to 
incarceration.443 Additionally, guidelines could be established 
providing for “independent oversight of police departments” 
and restricting the use of citations as a measure of effective 
performance.444 The DOJ is currently seeking information 
about best practices for assessment of fines and fees.445 These 
best practices could establish guidelines for courts and 
municipalities. 
As outlined in the Westlake case in the Introduction, the 
CFPB also has supervisory, investigative, and enforcement 
powers. The CFPB and FTC share enforcement under the 
FDCPA,446 and they also coordinate activities with other 
 
 443. For more detail about potential guidelines for ability-to-pay hearings, see 
Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 4, at 535–37. Potential sources for 
establishing indigency standards include standards used for determining right to 
public defender and federal housing assistance. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE PROGRAM, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, ELIGIBLE FOR JUSTICE: GUIDELINES FOR APPOINTING 
DEFENSE COUNSEL (2008), https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx? 
id=22023&libID=21993 [https://perma.cc/G4RV-H4KQ]; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE FOR LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS (Sept. 2015), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/50782-
lowincomehousing-onecolumn.pdf [https://perma.cc/KH9N-PZB4]. 
 444. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.J., supra note 295, at 6. 
 445. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces 




 446. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the CFPB and the FTC 
(Jan. 20, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/120123ftc-cfpb-mou.pdf 
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agencies and state representatives.447 For example, Operation 
Collection Protection was “the first coordinated federal-state 
enforcement initiative targeting deceptive and abusive debt 
collection practices.”448 In 2015, at least 115 actions were filed 
“by . . . more than 70 law enforcement partners.”449 
Additionally, as part of its supervisory powers, the CFPB 
“conduct[s] internal examinations, visit[s] institutions, 
require[s] reports from them, and open[s] up their books and 
operations to scrutiny.”450 
The DOJ already exercises supervisory, investigatory, and 
enforcement powers as evidenced by its investigation of the 
Ferguson and Baltimore Police Departments.451 Additionally, 
the DOJ should require states and municipalities to provide 
data to evaluate their progress in addressing abuses related to 
criminal justice debt. Data accumulation and analysis is 
fundamental to deciding the appropriate courses of action.452 
The current system does not have an adequate process for 
collecting national statistics on the imposition of criminal 
 
[https://perma.cc/F6JJ-995C]. 
 447. See, e.g., Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of 
Attorneys General After Dodd-Frank, 99 IOWA L. REV. 115, 128 (2013) (discussing 
coordination with state attorneys general). 
 448. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC and Federal, State and Local 
Law Enforcement Partners Announce Nationwide Crackdown Against Abusive 
Debt Collectors (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2015/11/ftc-federal-state-local-law-enforcement-partners-announce 
[https://perma.cc/P6L7-Z6R9]. 
 449. Id. 
 450. Cordray, supra note 373. 
 451. FPD REP., supra note 41; BPD REP., supra note 288. See also Simone 
Weichselbaum, Policing the Police, MARSHALL PROJECT (May 26, 2015, 6:12 PM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/23/policing-the-police?utm_medium= 
email&utm_campaign=newsletter&utm_source=opening-statement&utm_term=n 
ewsletter-20160211-382#.UncKbIPQS [https://perma.cc/CTQ4-NUTU] (discussing 
the effectiveness of investigations). 
 452. See, e.g., JUSTICE POLICY INST., BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD END 
THE PRACTICE OF USING MONEY FOR BAIL 35 (2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/ 
uploads/justicepolicy/documents/bailfail.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ABD-BT5T] 
(identifying the need for national data to help develop bail reform); Edmund L. 
Andrews, Stanford Engineers’ ‘Law, Order & Algorithms’ Data Project Aims to 
Identify Bias in the Criminal Justice System (Feb. 10, 2016), 
http://news.stanford.edu/2016/02/10/law-order-algorithm-021016/ [https://perma.c 
c/N7J5-NLNG] (describing Stanford University’s School of Engineering 
development of a database of 100 million traffic stops throughout the United 
States to help identify discrimination and “design practices that are more 
equitable and effective at reducing crime”). The DOJ investigation of the 
Baltimore Police Department emphasized the importance of data collection and 
analysis. BPD REP., supra note 288, at 45. 
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justice debt.453 Establishing fact-gathering procedures and 
requiring reporting and collection of data will allow for 
continual study, assessment, and modification of appropriate 
actions. Additionally, such processes would help create greater 
transparency in the collection of criminal justice debt. 
Third-party companies that provide outsourcing services 
should be subject to oversight by municipalities and be 
required to provide reporting information about their 
operations. Employment of private companies could be 
conditioned upon compliance with established standards, 
reporting requirements, and approved fee schedules. 
Additionally, just as the CFPB produces annual reports of its 
activities under the FDCPA,454 the DOJ should provide similar 
reports reflecting its operations in addressing abuses in the 
collection of criminal justice debt. 
Dodd-Frank also requires the CFPB to collect and respond 
to consumer complaints.455 Accordingly, the CFPB has 
established an online complaint database that allows 
consumers to file complaints about collectors and sets up a 
process for resolving the claims.456 The DOJ should set up a 
similar system to help track and resolve complaints about 
criminal justice debt collection.457 
Just as the CFPB works with state and local groups, the 
DOJ offers resources and advice to states and municipalities. 
For example, in March 2016, the DOJ sent a letter to all state 
chief justices and court administrators containing information 
about their responsibilities associated with the collection of 
criminal justice debt.458 The letter set forth certain principles 
based on constitutional protections that courts should follow in 
imposing and enforcing fines and fees.459 The principles 
covered include the requirements that courts conduct indigency 
hearings before incarcerating an individual for failure to pay 
 
 453. HARRIS, supra note 57, at 6–8. 
 454. 15 U.S.C. § 1692m (2012). 
 455. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(c)(2) (2012). 
 456. See Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2017). 
[https://perma.cc/68ZR-SWZN]. 
 457. Sobol, Charging the Poor, supra note 4, at 538. 
 458. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 445. 
 459. Letter from Vanita Gupta & Lisa Foster, Office for Access to Justice, Civil 
Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 2 (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ 
crt/file/832461/download [https://perma.cc/ZJ3J-FT63]. 
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fines or fees; evaluate non-incarceration alternatives for those 
unable to pay; avoid using arrest warrants and license 
suspensions as collection methods rather than as a means of 
protecting public safety; and avoid using cash bail on indigent 
defendants who lack the ability to pay but are neither a flight 
risk nor a threat to public safety.460 Additionally, the letter 
cautions courts to have oversight and control over the potential 
unconstitutional actions of its staff and private companies who 
are delegated authority from the court.461 The letter explicitly 
identifies the possible conflicts of interest that arise when 
using private probation companies.462 The chief justices were 
encouraged to send the letters to all of their local judges and 
provide training and resources to help judges.463 The DOJ also 
sent information about a resource guide and grant program to 
help aid state and local authorities in the collection of fines and 
fees.464 
Finally, providing education and outreach is a primary 
function of the CFPB.465 The CFPB targets education for 
specific groups and has created form letters for use by 
debtors.466 Additionally, the DOJ should work with state and 
local groups, including non-profit organizations, to provide 
outreach and training to educate not only the actors involved in 
the collection of criminal justice debt but also the general 
public. Such programs are necessary to help mend the severe 
trust issues that currently exist in many communities arising 
from abusive criminal justice debt practices. 
The DOJ is already performing many of the functions that 
the CFPB is providing, including outreach and enforcement. 
Armed with a federal statute specifying prohibited and 
required practices for those involved in collecting criminal 
justice debt, the DOJ would be more effective in the battle 
against abuses in criminal justice debt collection. 
 
 460. Id. 
 461. Id. at 8. 
 462. Id. 
 463. Id. at 3. 
 464. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 445. 
 465. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(c)(1) (2012). 
 466. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: 
CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 42–45 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
201503_cfpb-fair-debt-collection-practices-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/WL9F-FUUA]. 
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IV.  FEDERALISM ISSUES 
A legitimate concern about the proposal for a federal act 
and use of a federal agency for enforcement is the impact that 
it would have on states’ rights.467 Similar concerns were raised 
with the adoption of the FDCPA and the use of the CFPB.468 To 
address some of these concerns the FDCPA explicitly describes 
its relationship to state law and sets forth a procedure for 
states to obtain exemptions.469 The FDCPA provides that state 
laws are preempted only to the extent that they are 
inconsistent with the FDCPA.470 Following the enactment of 
FDCPA, states enacted legislation similar to the FDCPA.471 
Some states provide even greater coverage.472 Moreover, states 
can receive an exemption under the FDCPA if they 
demonstrate substantially similar laws and adequate 
enforcement.473 Additionally, the CFPB operates with state 
and local authorities to coordinate enforcement and 
outreach.474 Similarly, as described in Part III, the DOJ is 
already involved in the enforcement and outreach activities 
similar to what the CFPB is doing.475 
My proposal is not meant to restrict state enforcement but, 
instead, to provide a floor for enforcement. Moreover, I hope 
that, as the experience with the FDCPA shows, states would 
adopt legislation similar to the FJDPA. Just as with the 
FDCPA, states would be encouraged to provide additional 
provisions to safeguard their citizens. Similarly, as with the 
FDCPA, the FJDPA could provide exemptions for states that 
enact laws that provide greater protections. 
To incentivize cooperation from states and municipalities, 
 
 467. A detailed analysis of the federalism concerns is beyond the scope of this 
Article. For an example of an article that addresses these concerns, see Professor 
Drinan’s advocacy of a federal act to provide counsel to indigent defendants. 
Drinan, supra note 367. 
 468. See, e.g., 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 307, at 1703 (describing the 
views of Senators Schmitt, Garn, and Tower that the legislation and regulation 
should be left to the states). 
 469. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692n, 1692o (2012). 
 470. Id. § 1692n. 
 471. See Geltzer & Woocher, supra note 310, at 1402. 
 472. See, e.g., TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 392.001(6) (West 2016) (debt collector 
includes creditors collecting on debts). 
 473. 15 U.S.C. § 1692o. 
 474. See supra notes 447–449 and accompanying text. 
 475. See supra Part III.C. 
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the FJDPA could condition federal grants on adoption of and 
compliance with its requirements.476 The DOJ currently uses 
the threat of deprivation of federal funds for failure to comply 
with its mandates.477 Similarly, commentators have advocated 
the withholding of federal funds to help enforce national 
standards for constitutional policing.478 Alternatively, instead 
of mandating federal standards, the federal government could 
“promulgat[e] guidelines and best practices” and use “grants 
and other funding incentives” to encourage adoption by state 
and local governments.479 
Finally, as discussed earlier, criminal justice debt abuses 
may impact interstate commerce and, more importantly, often 
involve deprivation of constitutional rights that justify the use 
of a federal statute.480 Under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the DOJ can 
seek relief against governmental authorities when its law 
enforcement officers engage in a “pattern or practice” of 
conduct that deprives individuals of their constitutional 
rights.481 The DOJ has used its authority under § 14141 to 
investigate police departments, file lawsuits, and seek consent 
decrees.482 Accordingly, to the extent abusive collection 
 
 476. Current proposals for reform of bail practices and the use of private 
probation companies rely on conditioning federal funds on state compliance. See 
supra notes 416–417 and accompanying text. For a discussion regarding factors 
that justify the conditioning of federal grants, see Drinan, supra note 367, at 509–
10. 
 477. See, e.g., Ryan J. Reilly, DOJ Threatens to Withhold Grants from States That 
Aren’t Protecting Prisoners from Rape, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 12, 2014, 2:16 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/12/doj-prison-rape_n_4775411.html 
[https://perma.cc/5QZ3-S58W]. 
 478. Nat Hentoff & Mike Hentoff, Real Police Reform Requires National 
Policing Standards, CATO INST. (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.cato.org/ 
publications/commentary/real-police-reform-requires-national-policing-standards 
[https://perma.cc/YSV9-DDWN]. 
 479. Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal 
Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 838–39 (2017). 
 480. See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing constitutional concerns regarding equal 
protection, due process, right to counsel, and potential violations of the Eighth 
Amendment’s restriction on excessive bail and fines). For a more detailed 
refutation of federalism concerns, see Drinan, supra note 367, at 508–10 
(advocating for a national right to counsel act based on Sixth Amendment 
concerns). 
 481. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012). 
 482. See, e.g., BPD REP., supra note 288; FPD REP., supra note 41. A detailed 
discussion of the use of § 14141 is beyond the scope of this Article. For more 
information, see Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3189 (2014) (providing an empirical review of the DOJ’s use of 
§ 14141). 
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methods form a pattern or practice of conduct depriving 
individuals of constitutional rights, the DOJ already has the 
authority to seek compliance of local government officials. 
The current municipality-by-municipality approach of 
federal lawsuits and federal investigations presents only a 
piecemeal approach to stemming violations.483 A federal 
statutory and regulatory approach offers a more efficient 
method of addressing these abuses and preventing abuses 
before they arise.484 
V. CONCLUSION 
Millions of Americans are subject to an abusive criminal 
justice debt system that often focuses more on revenue 
collection than public safety. They become trapped in the 
system because they are unable to pay the fines and fees 
assessed. Once in the system, their criminal justice debt 
escalates. Their poverty prevents them from ever escaping. 
Moreover, the system fosters discrimination and creates 
distrust in communities. 
A new approach is necessary to prevent abusive criminal 
justice debt practices. When faced with similar issues in the 
collection of civil debts, we turned to a federal framework. The 
holders of criminal justice debt share the financial 
consequences that consumer debtors have but also experience 
denial of benefits, loss of driver’s licenses, criminal records, 
arrest, and even incarceration. Given these greater 
consequences, we should provide even greater protection for 
individuals with criminal justice debt. A federal approach 
should be examined. The exact contours of a federal act need 
more detailed study and development. In March 2016, the DOJ 
established a National Task Force on Fines, Fees, and Bail 
Practices to develop model statutes, rules and procedures, and 
best practices. The task force includes state judges, 
legislatures, advocacy groups, and professors.485 That task 
 
 483. See Hentoff & Hentoff, supra note 478 (recognizing the need for national 
standards to address constitutional policing and stating that “[i]t is long past time 
for the U.S. government to acknowledge that police misconduct is not a series of 
isolated problems that can be solved by a series of individual civil rights 
enforcement actions”). 
 484. See Balko, supra note 35. 
 485. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 445. 
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force should examine the need for a federal statutory and 
regulatory solution to confront abuses in the collection of 
criminal justice debt.486 
 
 486. Id. Similarly, the Laura and John Arnold Foundation commissioned a 
five-year, nearly $4 million project, to study the imposition of criminal justice 
fines and fees at state and local levels by examining the practices in eight states. 
See Deborah Bach, UW Project Focuses on Fines and Fees That Create ‘Prisoners 
of Debt’ (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.washington.edu/news/2015/12/04/uw-project-
focuses-on-fines-and-fees-that-create-prisoners-of-debt/ [https://perma.cc/YD3F-
3FNR]. The study was subsequently expanded to cover nine states and the first-
year report to the Foundation was released in April, 2017. See ALEXES HARRIS ET 
AL., MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3–4 (2017), 
http://www.monetarysanctions.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Monetary-
Sanctions-Legal-Review-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EUS-3WBC]. 
